Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings: Computing and Markets 2005

• Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Congestion games with failures.
  
• Hongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, Rakesh V. Vohra:
  Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types.
  
• Kazuo Murota:
  Fundamentals in Discrete Convex Analysis.
  
• Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations.
  
• Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin:
  Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation.
  
• Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf:
  A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible Mechanisms.
  
• Robert W. Day, S. Raghavan:
  Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions.
  
• Kevin Leyton-Brown, Navin A. R. Bhat:
  Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games.
  
• Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
  05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets.
  
• Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
  05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets.
  
• Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games.
  
• Edward Anderson, Frank Kelly, Richard Steinberg:
  A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network.
  
• Henner Gimpel:
  Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining.
  
• Anna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason:
  Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions.
  
• Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Local-Effect Games.
  
• Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:
  The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost.
  
• Rainer Feldmann:
  Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum Congestion.
  
• Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:
  Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions.
  
• Alon Altman:
  The PageRank Axioms.
  
• Tuomas Sandholm:
  Automated Mechanism Design.