The Logic of Theory Change 1989: Konstanz, Germany

Foundations

• Risto Hilpinen:
  Inquiry, argumentation and knowledge. 3-18
  
• Jon Doyle:
  Rational control of reasoning in Artificial Intelligence. 19-48
  

Models of Theory Change

• João P. Martins:
  Computational issues in belief revision. 51-71
  
• Karl Schlechta:
  Some results on theory revision. 72-92
  
• Sten Lindström, Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz:
  Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision. 93-126
  

The Ramsey Test for Conditionals

• Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau, Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz:
  The negative Ramsey test: another triviality result. 129-134
  
• Hans Rott:
  A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. Part 1: Semantics and logic of simple conditionals. 135-181
  

Theory Change and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

• David Makinson, Peter Gärdenfors:
  Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic. 185-205
  
• Gerhard Brewka:
  Belief revision in a framework for default reasoning. 206-222
  
• Klaus U. Schulz:
  Preferential cumulative reasoning and nonmonotonic semantic nets. 223-240
  

Reformulations and Extensions

• David Pearce, Wolfgang Rautenberg:
  Propositional logic based on the dynamics of disbelief. 243-258
  
• André Fuhrmann:
  On the modal logic of theory change. 259-281
  
• Nicholas Asher:
  Discourse representation theory and belief dynamics. 282-321
  
• Reinhard Niederée:
  Multiple contraction. A further case against Gärdenfors' principle of recovery. 322-334