1. SAGT 2008: Paderborn, Germany

Invited Talks

• Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  The Search for Equilibrium Concepts. 1-3
  
• Reinhard Selten:
  Experimental Results on the Process of Goal Formation and Aspiration Adaptation. 4
  
• Paul G. Spirakis:
  Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games. 5-21
  

Session 1: Routing and Scheduling I

• Martin Hoefer, Alexander Souza:
  The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routing. 22-32
  
• Dimitris Fotakis:
  Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy. 33-45
  
• Leah Epstein, Rob van Stee:
  The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited. 46-57
  
• Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
  Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. 58-69
  

Session 2: Markets

• Shuchi Chawla, Tim Roughgarden:
  Bertrand Competition in Networks. 70-82
  
• Moshe Babaioff, Patrick Briest, Piotr Krysta:
  On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems. 83-94
  
• Pavlos Efraimidis, Lazaros Tsavlidis:
  Window-Games between TCP Flows. 95-108
  
• Ronen Gradwohl:
  Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Network. 109-120
  

Session 3: Routing and Scheduling II

• Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
  Atomic Congestion Games: Fast, Myopic and Concurrent. 121-132
  
• Gunes Ercal, Rafit Izhak-Ratzin, Rupak Majumdar, Adam Meyerson:
  Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks. 133-144
  
• Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas, Andreas Pieris:
  Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture. 145-157
  
• Matthias Englert, Thomas Franke, Lars Olbrich:
  Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria. 158-169
  

Session 4: Mechanism Design

• Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer:
  Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. 170-181
  
• Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Evdokia Nikolova, Martin Pál:
  A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling. 182-193
  
• Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Carmine Ventre:
  Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize. 194-205
  
• Markus Bläser, Elias Vicari:
  Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Algebraic Communication Complexity. 206-217
  

Session 5: Potpourri of Games

• Nadine Baumann, Sebastian Stiller:
  The Price of Anarchy of a Network Creation Game with Exponential Payoff. 218-229
  
• Ulrich Faigle, Britta Peis:
  A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games. 230-241
  
• Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel:
  Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium. 242-254
  
• Oren Ben-Zwi, Amir Ronen:
  The Local and Global Price of Anarchy of Graphical Games. 255-266
  

Session 6: Solution Concepts

• Sébastien Hémon, Michel de Rougemont, Miklos Santha:
  Approximate Nash Equilibria for Multi-player Games. 267-278
  
• Amos Fiat, Hila Pochter:
  Subjective vs.Objective Reality - The Risk of Running Late. 279-290
  
• Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
  On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria. 291-302
  
• Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett, Kirk Pruhs, Aaron Roth:
  The Price of Stochastic Anarchy. 303-314
  

Session 7: Cost Sharing

• Janina A. Brenner, Guido Schäfer:
  Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems. 315-326
  
• Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? 327-336
  
• Niv Buchbinder, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Joseph Naor, Ariel Orda:
  Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies. 337-349
  
• Yvonne Bleischwitz, Florian Schoppmann:
  Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location. 350-361
  

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