2. SAGT 2009: Paphos, Cyprus

• Dov Monderer:
  Monotonicity in Mechanism Design. 1
  
• Mihalis Yannakakis:
  Computational Aspects of Equilibria. 2-13
  
• Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
  A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem. 14-23
  
• André Berger, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hossein Naeemi:
  Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations. 24-35
  
• Clemens Thielen, Sven Oliver Krumke:
  Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents. 36-47
  
• Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Partition Equilibrium. 48-59
  
• Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. 60-71
  
• José R. Correa, Nicolas Figueroa:
  On the Planner's Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design. 72-84
  
• Krzysztof R. Apt, Arantza Estévez-Fernández:
  Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems. 85-96
  
• Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring:
  Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games. 97-108
  
• Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
  Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency. 109-121
  
• Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii V. Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Jörg Rothe, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
  The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games. 122-134
  
• Christoph Dürr, Nguyen Kim Thang:
  Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games. 135-146
  
• Hyunwoo Jung, Kyung-Yong Chwa:
  The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds. 147-158
  
• Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das, Yonatan Naamad:
  Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings. 159-170
  
• Elliot Anshelevich, Satish Ukkusuri:
  Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing. 171-182
  
• Christine Chung, Evangelia Pyrga:
  Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games. 183-195
  
• Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
  Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games. 196-207
  
• Elliot Anshelevich, Bugra Caskurlu:
  Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design. 208-219
  
• Andrew Byde, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings:
  Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities. 220-232
  
• Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz:
  A New Derandomization of Auctions. 233-237
  
• Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann:
  The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles. 238-249
  
• Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala:
  Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. 250-262
  
• Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, Alexander Skopalik:
  Doing Good with Spam Is Hard. 263-274
  
• Khaled M. Elbassioni, Rajiv Raman, Saurabh Ray, René Sitters:
  On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems. 275-286
  
• Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
  On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games. 287-298
  
• Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko:
  Swap Bribery. 299-310
  
• Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli:
  Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games. 311-322
  
• Ronald Koch, Martin Skutella:
  Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time. 323-334
  
• Po-An Chen, David Kempe:
  Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes. 335-346
  
• Leah Epstein, Asaf Levin:
  On Equilibria for ADM Minimization Games. 347-358