3. SAGT 2010: Athens, Greece

• Amos Fiat, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers. 1-14
  
• Paul W. Goldberg:
  How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? 15-17
  
• Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:
  A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets. 18-29
  
• Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:
  Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market. 30-41
  
• Elliot Anshelevich, Bugra Caskurlu, Ameya Hate:
  Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games. 42-53
  
• Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale, Giuseppe Persiano:
  Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics. 54-65
  
• Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:
  Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games. 66-77
  
• Pranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Or Sheffet, Santosh Vempala:
  On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games. 78-89
  
• Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Gianpiero Monaco:
  Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games. 90-101
  
• Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
  On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play. 102-113
  
• Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael M. Frongillo, Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Gregory Valiant:
  On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria. 114-125
  
• Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira:
  On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games. 126-137
  
• Uriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
  A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium. 138-149
  
• Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Responsive Lotteries. 150-161
  
• Dimitris Fotakis, George Karakostas, Stavros G. Kolliopoulos:
  On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users. 162-173
  
• Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani:
  Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games. 174-185
  
• Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It. 186-197
  
• Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
  The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements. 198-209
  
• Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind:
  Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting. 210-221
  
• Rajgopal Kannan, Costas Busch:
  Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy. 222-233
  
• Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang:
  Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations. 234-245
  
• Volodymyr Kuleshov, Adrian Vetta:
  On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms. 246-261
  
• Martin Macko, Kate Larson, L'ubos Steskal:
  Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time. 262-275
  
• Matús Mihalák, Jan Christoph Schlegel:
  The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant. 276-287
  
• Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz:
  Truthful Fair Division. 288-299
  
• Uri Nadav, Georgios Piliouras:
  No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand. 300-311
  
• Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:
  On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria. 312-322
  
• Vijay V. Vazirani:
  2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties. 323-334
  
• Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis:
  On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. 335-346
  
• Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
  Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. 347-358
  

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