4. ACM-EC 2003:
San Diego, California, USA Proceedings 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003), San Diego, California, USA, June 9-12, 2003.
ACM 2003, ISBN 1-58113-679-X
- Jon M. Kleinberg, Mark Sandler:
Convergent algorithms for collaborative filtering.
- Chrysanthos Dellarocas:
Efficiency through feedback-contingent fees and rewards in auction marketplaces with adverse selection and moral hazard.
- Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
- Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline:
Envy-free auctions for digital goods.
- Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta:
Playing large games using simple strategies.
- Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Luis E. Ortiz:
Correlated equilibria in graphical games.
- Michael L. Littman, Peter Stone:
A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games.
- Chris Preist, Claudio Bartolini, Andrew Byde:
Agent-based service composition through simultaneous negotiation in forward and reverse auctions.
- Moshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh:
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation.
- Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham:
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions.
- Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada:
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids.
- Evangelos Markakis, Amin Saberi:
On the core of the multicommodity flow game.
- Richard Cole, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tim Roughgarden:
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
- Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games.
- Michael P. Wellman, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Daniel M. Reeves, Sowmya Swaminathan:
Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling.
- Eiichiro Kazumori:
Selling online versus offline: theory and evidences from Sotheby's.
- Yuan-Chi Chang, Chung-Sheng Li, John R. Smith:
Searching dynamically bundled goods with pairwise relations.
- Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman:
Betting boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas.
- Joan Feigenbaum, Lance Fortnow, David M. Pennock, Rahul Sami:
Computation in a distributed information market.
- Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri:
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions.
- Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm:
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries.
Poster paper sessions
Last update Thu May 23 04:56:29 2013
CET by the DBLP Team — Data released under the ODC-BY 1.0 license — See also our legal information page
- Eugene Fink, Josh Johnson, John Hershberger:
Multi-attribute exchange market: representation and indexing of orders.
- Zhen Liu, Laura Wynter, Cathy H. Xia:
Pricing and QoS of information services in a competitive market (extended abstract).
- Shuchi Chawla, D. Kitchin, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi, Amitabh Sinha:
Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networks.
- Andrew Byde:
Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design.
- Markus Bläser, Bodo Manthey:
Budget balanced mechanisms for the multicast pricing problem with rates.
- Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
- Andrew Byde, Michael Yearworth, Kay-Yut Chen, Claudio Bartolini, Nir Vulkan:
AutONA: a system for automated multiple 1-1 negotiation.
- Floortje Alkemade, Johannes A. La Poutré, Hans M. Amman:
Intermediaries in an electronic trade network.
- Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Extensions of the spending constraint-model: existence and uniqueness of equilibria (extended abstract).
- Li Li, Stephen F. Smith:
An agent-based framework for dynamic multi-period continuous double auctions in B2B exchanges.
- Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Hong Zhu:
Combinatorial auction across independent markets (extended abstract).
- Cuihong Li, Gerald Tesauro:
A strategic decision model for multi-attribute bilateral negotiation with alternating.
- Glen Nuckolls, Charles U. Martel, Stuart G. Stubblebine:
Certifying data from multiple sources (extended abstract).
- Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency.
- Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes:
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions.
- Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Kevin M. Lochner:
Price prediction in a trading agent competition (extended abstract).
- Aranyak Mehta, Scott Shenker, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Profit-maximizing multicast pricing by approximating fixed points.
- Felix Brandt:
Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design.
- Te-Kai Liu, Amir Behroozi, Santhosh Kumaran:
A performance model for a BPI middleware.
- James E. Hanson, Gerald Tesauro, Jeffrey O. Kephart, E. C. Snibl:
Multi-agent implementation of asymmetric protocol for bilateral negotiations.
- Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Using value queries in combinatorial auctions.
- Li Xiong, Ling Liu:
A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer ecommerce communities.
- Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.
- Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.
- Indu Bingham, Barbara Hoefle, Kim Phan, Jim Sizemore, Arthur M. Keller:
Collaboration software to reduce inventory and increase response.
- Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids.
- Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer:
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation.
- Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes:
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design.
- Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Ashish Sureka:
Computing the outcome of proxy bidding in combinatorial auctions extended abstract.
- Jiong Sun, Norman M. Sadeh:
Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling.
- Ko Fujimura, Takuo Nishihara:
Reputation rating system based on past behavior of evaluators.
- Rahul Garg, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Akshat Verma:
Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality.
- Henry Lieberman, Earl Wagner:
End-user tools for debugging e-commerce.
- Christopher H. Brooks, Robert S. Gazzale, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Edmund H. Durfee:
Improving learning performance by applying economic knowledge.
- Martin Bichler, Jayant Kalagnanam:
A nonoparametric estimator for setting: reserve prices in procurement auctions.
- Soumyadip Ghosh, Jayant Kalagnanam:
Polyhedral sampling for multiattribute preference elicitation.
- Sandip Debnath, David M. Pennock, C. Lee Giles, Steve Lawrence:
Information incorporation in online in-Game sports betting markets.
- Thomas Kwok, Thao Nguyen, Linh Lam:
Tracking results from multichannel marketing programs on electronic commerce.
- Song Han, Winson K. Y. Yeung, Jie Wang:
Identity-based confirmer signatures from pairings over elliptic curves.
- Daniel Dajun Zeng, Fei-Yue Wang, Sudha Ram:
Storage allocation in web prefetching techniques.
- Chito Jovellanos:
Semantic and syntactic interoperability: in transactional systems.
- Norman M. Sadeh, Ting-Chak Chan, Linh Van, Oh Byung Kwon, Kazuaki Takizawa:
A semantic web environment for context-aware m-commerce.
- Amitava Dutta, Rahul Roy:
Effects of information feedback loops on supply chain performance.
- Charles Polk, Robin Hanson, John O. Ledyard, Takashi Ishikida:
The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market.
- John V. Harrison, Anna Andrusiewicz:
The digital signage exchange: a virtual marketplace for out-of-home digital advertising.
- John O. Ledyard, John C. Lin:
Baby bond connect: software for combined value trading.
- Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes:
Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations.
- Boi Faltings:
Incentive compatible open constraint optimization.
- Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker:
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing.