6. ACM-EC 2005: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

• Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms. 1-8
  
• Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon:
  Graceful service degradation (or, how to know your payment is late). 9-18
  
• Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul W. P. J. Grefen:
  Dynamic and secure B2B e-contract update management. 19-28
  
• Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan:
  On the computational power of iterative auctions. 29-43
  
• Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi:
  Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. 44-51
  
• Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan:
  Fairness and optimality in congestion games. 52-57
  
• Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David M. Pennock:
  Information markets vs. opinion pools: an empirical comparison. 58-67
  
• Nicolas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, John Chuang:
  Content availability, pollution and poisoning in file sharing peer-to-peer networks. 68-77
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Communication complexity of common voting rules. 78-87
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Complexity of (iterated) dominance. 88-97
  
• Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus, Nicholas R. Jennings:
  Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels. 98-107
  
• Edith Elkind:
  True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs. 108-116
  
• Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker:
  Hidden-action in multi-hop routing. 117-126
  
• Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang:
  A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters. 127-136
  
• Pedro Ferreira, Marvin A. Sirbu:
  Inefficiency in provisioning interconnected communication networks. 137-146
  
• Keith B. Frikken, Mikhail J. Atallah, Chen Zhang:
  Privacy-preserving credit checking. 147-154
  
• Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart G. Stubblebine:
  Secure distributed human computation. 155-164
  
• Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes:
  Online auctions with re-usable goods. 165-174
  
• Jason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew:
  From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. 175-182
  
• Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan:
  Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions. 183-192
  
• Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham:
  Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games. 193-202
  
• Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami:
  First-price path auctions. 203-212
  
• Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang:
  Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework. 213-222
  
• Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick:
  Self-selection, slipping, salvaging, slacking, and stoning: the impacts of negative feedback at eBay. 223-231
  
• Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan:
  Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem using the Shapley value. 232-239
  
• Ahuva Mu'alem:
  On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms. 240-248
  
• David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan:
  ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. 249-258
  
• Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Congestion games with failures. 259-268
  
• Pearl Pu, Li Chen:
  Integrating tradeoff support in product search tools for e-commerce sites. 269-278
  
• Amir Ronen, Daniel J. Lehmann:
  Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions. 279-285
  
• Michael E. Saks, Lan Yu:
  Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains. 286-293