6. ACM-EC 2005:
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
John Riedl, Michael J. Kearns, Michael K. Reiter (Eds.):
Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 5-8, 2005.
ACM 2005
- Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms.
1-8

- Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon:
Graceful service degradation (or, how to know your payment is late).
9-18

- Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul W. P. J. Grefen:
Dynamic and secure B2B e-contract update management.
19-28

- Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan:
On the computational power of iterative auctions.
29-43

- Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi:
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders.
44-51

- Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan:
Fairness and optimality in congestion games.
52-57

- Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David M. Pennock:
Information markets vs. opinion pools: an empirical comparison.
58-67

- Nicolas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, John Chuang:
Content availability, pollution and poisoning in file sharing peer-to-peer networks.
68-77

- Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity of common voting rules.
78-87

- Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of (iterated) dominance.
88-97

- Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels.
98-107

- Edith Elkind:
True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs.
108-116

- Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker:
Hidden-action in multi-hop routing.
117-126

- Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang:
A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters.
127-136

- Pedro Ferreira, Marvin A. Sirbu:
Inefficiency in provisioning interconnected communication networks.
137-146

- Keith B. Frikken, Mikhail J. Atallah, Chen Zhang:
Privacy-preserving credit checking.
147-154

- Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart G. Stubblebine:
Secure distributed human computation.
155-164

- Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes:
Online auctions with re-usable goods.
165-174

- Jason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew:
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions.
175-182

- Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan:
Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions.
183-192

- Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham:
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games.
193-202

- Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami:
First-price path auctions.
203-212

- Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang:
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework.
213-222

- Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick:
Self-selection, slipping, salvaging, slacking, and stoning: the impacts of negative feedback at eBay.
223-231

- Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan:
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem using the Shapley value.
232-239

- Ahuva Mu'alem:
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms.
240-248

- David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan:
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange.
249-258

- Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with failures.
259-268

- Pearl Pu, Li Chen:
Integrating tradeoff support in product search tools for e-commerce sites.
269-278

- Amir Ronen, Daniel J. Lehmann:
Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions.
279-285

- Michael E. Saks, Lan Yu:
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains.
286-293

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