8. ACM-EC 2007: San Diego, California, USA

First to market

• Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Beyond moulin mechanisms. 1-10
  
• Thành Nguyen, Éva Tardos:
  Approximately maximizing efficiency and revenue in polyhedral environments. 11-19
  
• Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
  Generalized trade reduction mechanisms. 20-29
  
• Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
  Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. 30-39
  

The price is right

• Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Clifford Stein:
  Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions. 40-49
  
• Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock:
  Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions. 50-56
  
• Juan Feng, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang:
  Dynamic price competition on the internet: advertising auctions. 57-58
  
• Garud Iyengar, Anuj Kumar:
  An equilibrium model for matching impatient demand and patient supply over time. 59-65
  

Pass It On

• Esteban Arcaute, Adam Kirsch, Ravi Kumar, David Liben-Nowell, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
  On threshold behavior in query incentive networks. 66-74
  
• Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, Tom Wexler:
  The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networks. 75-83
  
• Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
  Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. 84-92
  
• Yogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson:
  Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism. 93-102
  
• Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  Congestion games with malicious players. 103-112
  

Empirical excursions

• Kan Takeuchi, John Lin, Yan Chen, Thomas A. Finholt:
  Shake it up baby: scheduling with package auctions. 113
  
• James Reilly, Jiyong Zhang, Lorraine McGinty, Pearl Pu, Barry Smyth:
  Evaluating compound critiquing recommenders: a real-user study. 114-123
  
• Stephan Schosser, Klemens Böhm, Bodo Vogt:
  Indirect partner interaction in peer-to-peer networks: stimulating cooperation by means of structure. 124-133
  
• Arjun Talwar, Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
  Understanding user behavior in online feedback reporting. 134-142
  

A complex collection

• Larry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
  Trading networks with price-setting agents. 143-151
  
• Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco:
  On the complexity of combinatorial auctions: structured item graphs and hypertree decomposition. 152-161
  
• Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg:
  Computing good nash equilibria in graphical games. 162-171
  
• Daniel Golovin:
  Stochastic packing-market planning. 172-181
  

Recommended for people like you

• Christopher Scaffidi, Kevin Bierhoff, Eric Chang, Mikhael Felker, Herman Ng, Chun Jin:
  Red Opal: product-feature scoring from reviews. 182-191
  
• Daniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar:
  Recommender systems and their impact on sales diversity. 192-199
  
• Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
  Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments. 200-209
  
• Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources. 210-217
  

The price is optimal

• David Kempe, Adam Meyerson, Nainesh Solanki, Ramnath K. Chellappa:
  Pricing of partially compatible products. 218-226
  
• Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman:
  Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctions. 227-236
  
• John O. Ledyard:
  Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders. 237-242
  
• Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
  Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. 243-251
  
• Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy:
  Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. 252-261
  

Searching for sponsors

• Matthew Cary, Aparna Das, Benjamin Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, Michael Schwarz:
  Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. 262-271
  
• Zoë Abrams, Ofer Mendelevitch, John Tomlin:
  Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints. 272-278
  
• Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Mediators in position auctions. 279-287
  
• Mohammad Mahdian, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi:
  Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates. 288-294
  

Not for sale

• David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. 295-304
  
• Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern:
  Optimizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists. 305-315
  
• Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami:
  A strategic model for information markets. 316-325
  
• Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Evdokia Nikolova, David M. Pennock:
  Betting on permutations. 326-335
  

Last but not least

• Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg:
  Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover. 336-345
  
• Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
  Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. 346-351
  
• Tomás Feder, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi:
  Approximating nash equilibria using small-support strategies. 352-354
  
• Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  Progress in approximate nash equilibria. 355-358
  

Workshops

• Daniel Grosu, Ratul Mahajan, Rahul Sami:
  Joint workshop on the economics of networked systems and incentive-based computing. 359-360
  
• Yiling Chen, John O. Ledyard, David M. Pennock, Eric Zitzewitz:
  Second workshop on prediction markets. 361-362
  
• Mehmet Sayal, Martin Hepp:
  EC 2007 workshop outline -- DEECS 2007: the 3rd international workshop on data engineering issues in e-commerce and services. 363-364
  

Tutorials

• Yiling Chen:
  Prediction markets: economics, computation, and mechanism design. 365
  
• Neel Sundaresan:
  Online trust and reputation systems. 366-367
  
• Foster J. Provost, Arun Sundararajan:
  Modeling complex networks for electronic commerce. 368
  
• Kartik Hosanagar, Michael Schwarz:
  Tutorial on sponsored search. 369
  

Last update Sun May 19 23:34:42 2013 CET by the DBLP Team — Data released under the ODC-BY 1.0 license — See also our legal information page