10. ACM-EC 2009: Stanford, California, USA

Session 1

• Vahab S. Mirrokni, Alexander Skopalik:
  On the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibria. 1-10
  
• Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Jacek Sroka, Andrew Dowell, Michael J. Wooldridge, Peter McBurney, Nicholas R. Jennings:
  On representing coalitional games with externalities. 11-20
  
• Hervé Moulin:
  Pricing traffic in a spanning network. 21-30
  
• Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alex Samorodnitsky:
  A new perspective on implementation by voting trees. 31-40
  

Session 2

• Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline:
  Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. 41-50
  
• David Robert Martin Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
  Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions. 51-60
  
• Moshe Babaioff, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
  Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations. 61-70
  
• Nikhil R. Devenur, Thomas P. Hayes:
  The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations. 71-78
  

Session 3

• Moshe Babaioff, Yogeshwer Sharma, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
  Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract. 79-88
  
• Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes:
  Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. 89-98
  
• Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade:
  The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions. 99-106
  
• Renato D. Gomes, Kane S. Sweeney:
  Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction. 107-108
  

Session 4

• Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham:
  Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions. 109-118
  
• Dominic DiPalantino, Milan Vojnovic:
  Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions. 119-128
  
• Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
  Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. 129-138
  
• Jiaqian Zheng, Xiaoyuan Wu, Junyu Niu, Alvaro Bolivar:
  Substitutes or complements: another step forward in recommendations. 139-146
  

Session 5

• Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
  Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. 147-156
  
• David M. Rahman:
  But who will monitor the monitor? 157-158
  
• Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna:
  Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results. 159-168
  
• Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
  An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. 169-176
  

Session 6

• Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Approximate mechanism design without money. 177-186
  
• Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasan:
  On random sampling auctions for digital goods. 187-196
  
• Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conitzer:
  A qualitative vickrey auction. 197-206
  
• Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald:
  Destroy to save. 207-214
  

Session 7

• Bobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina:
  Managing the quality of CPC traffic. 215-224
  
• Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
  Simple versus optimal mechanisms. 225-234
  
• Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
  Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms. 235-242
  
• Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Revenue submodularity. 243-252
  

Session 8

• Michael Ostrovsky:
  Information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders. 253-254
  
• Shipra Agrawal, Erick Delage, Mark Peters, Zizhuo Wang, Yinyu Ye:
  A unified framework for dynamic pari-mutuel information market design. 255-264
  
• Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock:
  Collective revelation: a mechanism for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictions. 265-274
  
• Nikolay Archak, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis:
  Modeling volatility in prediction markets. 275-284
  

Session 9

• Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour:
  The price of uncertainty. 285-294
  
• Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen:
  Policy teaching through reward function learning. 295-304
  
• Shuchi Chawla, Feng Niu:
  The price of anarchy in bertrand games. 305-314
  
• Milan Bradonjic, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Adam Meyerson, Alan Roytman:
  On the price of mediation. 315-324
  

Session 10

• Eytan Bakshy, Brian Karrer, Lada A. Adamic:
  Social influence and the diffusion of user-created content. 325-334
  
• Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert:
  Social lending. 335-344
  
• Paul Resnick, Rahul Sami:
  Sybilproof transitive trust protocols. 345-354
  
• Oren Ben-Zwi, Danny Hermelin, Daniel Lokshtanov, Ilan Newman:
  An exact almost optimal algorithm for target set selection in social networks. 355-362
  

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