10. ACM-EC 2010: Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

David C. Parkes, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Moshe Tennenholtz (Eds.): Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, June 7-11, 2010. ACM 2010, ISBN 978-1-60558-822-3

Auctions I

John W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas:
Information asymmetries in pay-per-bid auctions. 1-12
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Aaron Roth:
Auctions with online supply. 13-22
Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Mallesh M. Pai:
Auctions with intermediaries: extended abstract. 23-32

David Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer:
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects. 33-42
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation. 43-52
Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami:
Composition of markets with conflicting incentives. 53-62

Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Computing pure strategy nash equilibria in compact symmetric games. 63-72
Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
Approximating pure nash equilibrium in cut, party affiliation, and satisfiability games. 73-82
Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. 83-92

Ramesh Johari, Sunil Kumar:
Congestible services and network effects. 93-94
Geoffrey G. Parker, Marshall W. van Alstyne:
Innovation, openness & platform control. 95-96
Sven Seuken, Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri:
Market design & analysis for a P2P backup system. 97-108

Erik Vee, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram:
Optimal online assignment with forecasts. 109-118
John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers:
Matching in networks with bilateral contracts: extended abstract. 119-120
Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Manan Sanghi:
Fast algorithms for finding matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs with applications to display ads. 121-128

Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan:
Revenue maximization with a single sample. 129-138
Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan:
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. 139-148
Shuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design. 149-158

Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract. 159-166
Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira:
Approximate privacy: foundations and quantification (extended abstract). 167-178
Po-An Chen, Mary David, David Kempe:
Better vaccination strategies for better people. 179-188

Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
A new understanding of prediction markets via no-regret learning. 189-198
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi:
Information aggregation in smooth markets. 199-206
Lian Jian, Rahul Sami:
Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets: effects of trading mechanism and information distribution. 207-208

John Joseph Horton, Lydia B. Chilton:
The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing. 209-218
Darius Braziunas, Craig Boutilier:
Assessing regret-based preference elicitation with the UTPREF recommendation system. 219-228
Daniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar, Andreas Buja:
Recommender systems and their effects on consumers: the fragmentation debate. 229-230

Sanmay Das, Malik Magdon-Ismail:
Collective wisdom: information growth in wikis and blogs. 231-240
Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Brian Rogers:
Cooperation in anonymous dynamic social networks. 241-242
Tanmoy Chakraborty, J. Stephen Judd, Michael Kearns, Jinsong Tan:
A behavioral study of bargaining in social networks. 243-252

Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule. 253-262
Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier:
The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice. 263-274
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel D. Procaccia:
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. 275-284

Martin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, Georg Ziegler:
Efficiency with linear prices: a theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. 285-286
Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman, Guha Balakrishnan:
Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition. 287-296
David H. Reiley, Sai-Ming Li, Randall A. Lewis:
Northern exposure: a field experiment measuring externalities between search advertisements. 297-304

Itai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and match. 305-314
Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, Zeyuan Allen Zhu:
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games. 315-324
Shaddin Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh:
Truthful assignment without money. 325-334

Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. 335-344
Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai:
Cooperation and competition in strategic games with private information. 345-346
Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind:
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions. 347-356

Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, Duncan J. Watts, David M. Pennock:
Prediction without markets. 357-366
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market. 367-376
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves:
A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker. 377-386

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