12. ACM-EC 2011: San Jose, CA, USA

Network externalities

• Larry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert D. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
  Network formation in the presence of contagious risk. 1-10
  
• Nima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Kamesh Munagala:
  Optimal auctions with positive network externalities. 11-20
  
• Daniel P. Enemark, Mathew D. McCubbins, Ramamohan Paturi, Nicholas Weller:
  Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems. 21-26
  

Online mechanisms

• Santiago Balseiro, Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan:
  Yield optimization of display advertising with ad exchange. 27-28
  
• Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens:
  Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems. 29-38
  
• Ravi Kumar, Silvio Lattanzi, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Andrea Vattani:
  Hiring a secretary from a poset. 39-48
  

Sponsored search

• Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri:
  The effects of exposure time on memory of display advertisements. 49-58
  
• Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz:
  Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field experiment. 59-60
  
• Furcy Pin, Peter Key:
  Stochastic variability in sponsored search auctions: observations and models. 61-70
  
• Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
  GSP auctions with correlated types. 71-80
  
• Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
  On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions. 81-90
  
• Peerapong Dhangwatnotai:
  Multi-keyword sponsored search. 91-100
  

Complexity and equilibria

• Federico Echenique, Daniel Golovin, Adam Wierman:
  A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics. 101-110
  
• Michele Budinich, Lance Fortnow:
  Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness. 111-118
  
• Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
  Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games. 119-126
  
• Benjamin E. Birnbaum, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lin Xiao:
  Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher markets. 127-136
  
• Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christopher A. Wilkens:
  Economies with non-convex production and complexity equilibria. 137-146
  

Social networks

• Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Ramesh Govindan, Ian Post:
  Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long way. 147-156
  
• Stephen Guo, Mengqiu Wang, Jure Leskovec:
  The role of social networks in online shopping: information passing, price of trust, and consumer choice. 157-166
  
• Arpita Ghosh, Satyen Kale, R. Preston McAfee:
  Who moderates the moderators?: crowdsourcing abuse detection in user-generated content. 167-176
  

Ranking, voting, and attribution

• Yi Sun, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Axiomatic attribution for multilinear functions. 177-178
  
• Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang:
  Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes. 179-188
  
• Arpita Ghosh, Patrick Hummel:
  A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content. 189-198
  

New directions in mechanism design

• Arpita Ghosh, Aaron Roth:
  Selling privacy at auction. 199-208
  
• Yuval Emek, Ron Karidi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
  Mechanisms for multi-level marketing. 209-218
  
• Scott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl:
  Concordance among holdouts: extended abstract. 219-220
  
• Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Nicolas S. Lambert, Omer Reingold:
  Only valuable experts can be valued. 221-222
  
• Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Jared Saia, Piotr Sankowski:
  Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets. 223-232
  

Approximation in mechanism design

• Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
  Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts. 233-242
  
• Jason Hartline, Qiqi Yan:
  Envy, truth, and profit. 243-252
  
• Shuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Azarakhsh Malekian:
  Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents. 253-262
  
• Shaddin Dughmi:
  A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization. 263-272
  
• Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer:
  Mechanisms for complement-free procurement. 273-282
  

Mechanisms with near-optimal equilibria

• Ruben Juarez, Rajnish Kumar:
  Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks. 283-284
  
• Philipp von Falkenhausen, Tobias Harks:
  Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games. 285-294
  
• Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan:
  Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods. 295-296
  

Market-making and computational finance

• Jacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
  An optimization-based framework for automated market-making. 297-306
  
• Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns:
  Market making and mean reversion. 307-314
  
• David Zuckerman:
  Pseudorandom financial derivatives. 315-320
  

Matching

• Itai Ashlagi, Alvin Roth:
  Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. 321-322
  
• Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes:
  A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives. 323-332
  
• Eduardo M. Azevedo, Jacob D. Leshno:
  The college admissions problem with a continuum of students. 333-334
  
• Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim:
  Matching with couples revisited. 335-336
  
• John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers:
  Multilateral matching. 337-338
  

Novel equilibrium analyses

• Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. 339-340
  
• Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, David C. Parkes:
  Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design. 341-350
  
• Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar:
  Best-response auctions. 351-360
  
• Changrong Deng, Sasa Pekec:
  Money for nothing: exploiting negative externalities. 361-370
  
• Hamid Nazerzadeh, Georgia Perakis:
  Menu pricing competition and a common agency with informed principals. 371-372
  

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