3. WINE 2007: San Diego, CA, USA

Invited Talks

• Kenneth J. Arrow:
  Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History. 1-2
  
• Herbert E. Scarf:
  My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications. 3
  
• Vijay V. Vazirani:
  Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm. 4
  
• Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  The Computation of Equilibria. 5-6
  

Equilibrium

• Lihua Chen, Yinyu Ye, Jiawei Zhang:
  A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization. 7-16
  
• Hartwig Bosse, Jaroslaw Byrka, Evangelos Markakis:
  New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games. 17-29
  
• Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking:
  A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets. 30-41
  
• Haralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis:
  An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria. 42-56
  
• Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. 57-69
  

Information Market

• Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen:
  Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. 70-81
  
• Mark Peters, Anthony Man-Cho So, Yinyu Ye:
  Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance. 82-95
  
• Gabrielle Demange:
  Information Sharing Communities. 96-107
  

Sponsored Auction

• Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions. 108-118
  
• Jennifer Wortman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Lihong Li, John Langford:
  Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions. 119-130
  
• S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Zoya Svitkina:
  Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising. 131-142
  
• Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh:
  Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search. 143-154
  
• Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves:
  Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions. 155-166
  
• Li Liang, Qi Qi:
  Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction. 167-178
  

Network Economics

• Dimitris Fotakis, Paul G. Spirakis:
  Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games. 179-190
  
• Esteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor:
  Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics. 191-207
  
• Heiner Ackermann, Patrick Briest, Alexander Fanghänel, Berthold Vöcking:
  Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets? 208-219
  
• Aristotelis Giannakos, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Vangelis Th. Paschos:
  On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems. 220-231
  
• Alexander Hall, Evdokia Nikolova, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities. 232-244
  

Mechanism Design I

• Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo:
  False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team. 245-256
  
• Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Ryan Fugger:
  Mechanism Design on Trust Networks. 257-268
  
• Samuel Ieong, Anthony Man-Cho So, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Stochastic Mechanism Design. 269-280
  

Social Networks

• Eyal Even-Dar, Asaf Shapira:
  A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks. 281-286
  
• Yair Halevi, Yishay Mansour:
  A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests. 287-292
  
• Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, T.-H. Hubert Chan, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi:
  A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost. 293-299
  
• Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
  PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution. 300-305
  
• Shishir Bharathi, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek:
  Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks. 306-311
  

Advertisement Pricing I

• Eyal Even-Dar, Michael J. Kearns, Jennifer Wortman:
  Sponsored Search with Contexts. 312-317
  
• Sudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi, Behnam Attaran Rezaei:
  Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions. 318-325
  
• Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh, Erik Vee:
  Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions. 326-334
  
• Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
  Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids. 335-340
  
• Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
  An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta -Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget. 341-346
  

Computational General Equilibrium

• Benton McCune:
  Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences. 347-355
  
• Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor:
  Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities. 356-361
  
• Nimrod Megiddo, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets. 362-367
  
• Chinmay Karande, Nikhil R. Devanur:
  Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes. 368-373
  
• Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur:
  On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets. 374-380
  

Network Games

• Martin Gairing, Florian Schoppmann:
  Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games. 381-387
  
• Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes:
  The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. 388-395
  
• Kurt Nielsen, Tomas Toft:
  Secure Relative Performance Scheme. 396-403
  
• Stefania Di Giannantonio, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom, Shmuel Zaks:
  Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem. 404-411
  
• Mohammad Hossein Falaki:
  The Wi-Fi Roaming Game. 412-418
  

Algorithmic Issues

• Heiner Ackermann, Alexander Skopalik:
  On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games. 419-430
  
• David J. Abraham, Ariel Levavi, David Manlove, Gregg O'Malley:
  The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs. 431-444
  
• Kyle W. Burke, Shang-Hua Teng:
  A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game. 445-456
  
• Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Group Dominant Strategies. 457-468
  
• Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien, Klaus W. Wagner:
  Weighted Boolean Formula Games. 469-481
  
• Qizhi Fang, Liang Kong:
  Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games. 482-490
  

Mechanism Design II

• Edith Elkind, S. Shaheen Fatima:
  Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions. 491-502
  
• Davide Bilò, Luca Forlizzi, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti:
  Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems. 503-514
  
• Yvonne Bleischwitz, Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann:
  To Be or Not to Be (Served). 515-528
  

Advertisement Pricing II

• Zoë Abrams, Michael Schwarz:
  Ad Auction Design and User Experience. 529-534
  
• Zoë Abrams, Erik Vee:
  Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm. 535-540
  
• Kuzman Ganchev, Alex Kulesza, Jinsong Tan, Ryan Gabbard, Qian Liu, Michael Kearns:
  Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search. 541-548
  
• Mohammad Mahdian, Kerem Tomak:
  Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising. 549-557
  
• Atish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sreenivas Gollapudi:
  Public Advertisement Broker Markets. 558-563
  

Mechanism Design III

• Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation. 564-569
  
• Aries Wei Sun:
  Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions. 570-575
  
• Arpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search. 576-583
  
• Qiqi Yan:
  On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions. 584-589
  
• Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
  Characterizing Truthful Market Design. 590-595
  

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