5. WINE 2009: Rome, Italy

Invited Talks

• S. Muthukrishnan:
  Ad Exchanges: Research Issues. 1-12
  
• H. Peyton Young:
  Adaptive Learning in Systems of Interacting Agents. 13-16
  
• Éva Tardos:
  Quantifying Outcomes in Games. 17
  

Regular Papers

• Martin Hoefer, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Shang-Hua Teng:
  Competitive Routing over Time. 18-29
  
• Pinyan Lu:
  On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling. 30-41
  
• Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà, Carmine Ventre:
  On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers. 42-54
  
• Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli:
  On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays. 55-66
  
• Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Julián Mestre:
  Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm. 67-78
  
• Sourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur:
  An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio. 79-88
  
• Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo:
  Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. 89-100
  
• David Arthur, Rajeev Motwani, Aneesh Sharma, Ying Xu:
  Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social Networks. 101-112
  
• Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Consistent Continuous Trust-Based Recommendation Systems. 113-124
  
• Jean Cardinal, Erik D. Demaine, Samuel Fiorini, Gwenaël Joret, Ilan Newman, Oren Weimann:
  The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game on Planar and Bounded-Treewidth Graphs. 125-136
  
• Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou:
  Tighter Bounds for Facility Games. 137-148
  
• Claudia Lindner, Jörg Rothe:
  Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols. 149-159
  
• Thành Nguyen, Éva Tardos:
  Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria via Lovász Local Lemma. 160-171
  
• Renato Gomes, Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis:
  Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment. 172-183
  
• Martin Gairing:
  Covering Games: Approximation through Non-cooperation. 184-195
  
• Sharad Goel, Sébastien Lahaie, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
  Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search. 196-207
  
• Arpita Ghosh, Randolph Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
  Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising. 208-219
  
• Esteban Arcaute, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
  Social Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job Market. 220-231
  
• Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Rob van Stee:
  Maximizing the Minimum Load: The Cost of Selfishness. 232-243
  
• Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves:
  Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. 244-255
  
• Paolo Penna, Florian Schoppmann, Riccardo Silvestri, Peter Widmayer:
  Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games. 256-267
  
• Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman:
  Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies. 268-279
  
• Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:
  Nash Equilibria for Voronoi Games on Transitive Graphs. 280-291
  
• Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Orestis Telelis:
  Selfish Scheduling with Setup Times. 292-303
  
• Nithum Thain, Adrian Vetta:
  Computational Aspects of Multimarket Price Wars. 304-315
  
• Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
  The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games. 316-327
  
• Christopher A. Wilkens:
  The Complexity of Models of International Trade. 328-339
  
• Angelina Vidali:
  The Geometry of Truthfulness. 340-350
  
• Michal Feldman, Ran Tessler, Yoav Wilf:
  Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities. 351-361
  
• Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
  Nash Dynamics in Congestion Games with Similar Resources. 362-373
  
• Jon Feldman, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál:
  Online Ad Assignment with Free Disposal. 374-385
  
• Devansh Dikshit, Yadati Narahari:
  Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks. 386-397
  
• Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian:
  An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction. 398-409
  
• Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi, Jie Zhang:
  Direction Preserving Zero Point Computing and Applications. 410-421
  

Short Papers

• Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang:
  Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market Models. 422-429
  
• Joud Khoury, Chaouki T. Abdallah, Kate Krause, Jorge Crichigno:
  Route Distribution Incentives. 430-437
  
• Haris Aziz, Oded Lachish, Mike Paterson, Rahul Savani:
  Wiretapping a Hidden Network. 438-446
  
• Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Nick Gravin:
  Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions. 447-454
  
• Josep Díaz, Dieter Mitsche, Navin Rustagi, Jared Saia:
  On the Power of Mediators. 455-462
  
• Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring:
  Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property. 463-470
  
• Ilan Adler, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  A Note on Strictly Competitive Games. 471-474
  
• Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
  The Efficiency of Fair Division. 475-482
  
• Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis:
  Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism. 483-490
  
• Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina Epelman:
  Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse Traders. 491-497
  
• Amos Fiat, Amiram Wingarten:
  Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization. 498-504
  
• Jacomo Corbo, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik:
  Nudging Mechanisms for Technology Adoption. 505-512
  
• Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi:
  Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders. 513-520
  
• Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi:
  Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting. 521-528
  
• B. V. Ashwinkumar, Robert Kleinberg:
  Randomized Online Algorithms for the Buyback Problem. 529-536
  
• David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek:
  Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders. 537-544
  
• Arash Asadpour, Amin Saberi:
  On the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Congestion Games. 545-552
  
• Xi Alice Gao, Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock:
  Betting on the Real Line. 553-560
  
• Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
  Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness. 561-568
  
• Dömötör Pálvölgyi:
  2D-TUCKER Is PPAD-Complete. 569-574
  
• Paul Dütting, Monika Rauch Henzinger, Ingmar Weber:
  Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities. 575-582
  
• Xiaotie Deng, Jiajin Yu:
  A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users. 583-590
  
• Joshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, Tom Wexler:
  Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing Games. 591-599
  
• Thomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Andrew Byde, Nicholas R. Jennings:
  On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games. 600-607
  
• Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot:
  On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game. 608-615
  
• Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:
  Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic Agents. 616-622
  
• Qianya Lin, Yiling Chen:
  Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets. 623-631
  
• Mangesh Gupte, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Lu Han, Liviu Iftode, Pravin Shankar, Raluca M. Ursu:
  News Posting by Strategic Users in a Social Network. 632-639
  

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