 | 2009 |
|---|
| 90 |       | Joseph Farfel,
Vincent Conitzer:
A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market.
AAMAS (2) 2009: 1407-1408 |
| 89 | | Paul Harrenstein,
Mathijs de Weerdt,
Vincent Conitzer:
A qualitative vickrey auction.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 197-206 |
| 88 | | Joseph Farfel,
Vincent Conitzer:
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market.
AMMA 2009: 61-73 |
| 87 | | Naoki Ohta,
Vincent Conitzer,
Ryo Ichimura,
Yuko Sakurai,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations.
CP 2009: 623-638 |
| 86 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Jérôme Lang,
Lirong Xia:
How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?
IJCAI 2009: 103-108 |
| 85 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Matthew Rognlie,
Lirong Xia:
Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
IJCAI 2009: 109-115 |
| 84 | | Erik Halvorson,
Vincent Conitzer,
Ronald Parr:
Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games.
IJCAI 2009: 159-166 |
| 83 | | Lirong Xia,
Vincent Conitzer:
Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules.
IJCAI 2009: 336-341 |
| 82 | | Lirong Xia,
Michael Zuckerman,
Ariel D. Procaccia,
Vincent Conitzer,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules.
IJCAI 2009: 348-353 |
| 81 | | Joshua Letchford,
Vincent Conitzer,
Kamesh Munagala:
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To.
SAGT 2009: 250-262 |
| 80 | | Sayan Bhattacharya,
Vincent Conitzer,
Kamesh Munagala,
Lirong Xia:
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions
CoRR abs/0904.3501: (2009) |
| 2008 |
|---|
| 79 |  | Liad Wagman,
Vincent Conitzer:
Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting.
AAAI 2008: 190-195 |
| 78 | | Lirong Xia,
Vincent Conitzer:
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders.
AAAI 2008: 196-201 |
| 77 | | Lirong Xia,
Vincent Conitzer,
Jérôme Lang:
Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies.
AAAI 2008: 202-207 |
| 76 | | Mingyu Guo,
Vincent Conitzer:
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 1039-1046 |
| 75 | | Mingyu Guo,
Vincent Conitzer:
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 1047-1054 |
| 74 | | Liad Wagman,
Vincent Conitzer:
Strategic betting for competitive agents.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 847-854 |
| 73 | | Naoki Ohta,
Vincent Conitzer,
Yasufumi Satoh,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 927-934 |
| 72 | | Lirong Xia,
Vincent Conitzer:
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 109-118 |
| 71 | | Mingyu Guo,
Vincent Conitzer:
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 210-219 |
| 70 | | Lirong Xia,
Vincent Conitzer:
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 99-108 |
| 69 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.
WINE 2008: 295-306 |
| 68 | | Krzysztof R. Apt,
Vincent Conitzer,
Mingyu Guo,
Evangelos Markakis:
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.
WINE 2008: 426-437 |
| 67 | | Joshua Letchford,
Vincent Conitzer,
Kamal Jain:
An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games.
WINE 2008: 696-707 |
| 66 | | Krzysztof R. Apt,
Vincent Conitzer,
Mingyu Guo,
Evangelos Markakis:
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
CoRR abs/0810.2865: (2008) |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 65 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award.
AAMAS 2007: 253 |
| 64 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries.
AAMAS 2007: 65 |
| 63 | | Mingyu Guo,
Vincent Conitzer:
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 30-39 |
| 62 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.
Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 |
| 61 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness.
Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 |
| 60 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Incremental Mechanism Design.
IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256 |
| 59 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Vincent Conitzer,
Craig Boutilier:
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms.
IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506 |
| 58 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness.
TARK 2007: 102-111 |
| 57 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Jérôme Lang:
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?.
J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007) |
| 56 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.
Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007) |
| 55 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction.
SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 1-2 (2007) |
| 54 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination.
SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 69-70 (2007) |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 53 | | Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo,
Kohki Maruono,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
AAAI 2006 |
| 52 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates.
AAAI 2006 |
| 51 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Andrew J. Davenport,
Jayant Kalagnanam:
Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings.
AAAI 2006 |
| 50 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate.
AAAI 2006 |
| 49 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.
AAMAS 2006: 521-528 |
| 48 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium.
AAMAS 2006: 537-544 |
| 47 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90 |
| 46 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Nikesh Garera:
Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).
ICML 2006: 209-216 |
| 45 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.
Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006) |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 44 | | Vincent Conitzer:
Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design.
AAAI 2005: 1642-1643 |
| 43 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Paolo Santi:
Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations.
AAAI 2005: 248-254 |
| 42 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities.
AAAI 2005: 255-260 |
| 41 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It.
AAAI 2005: 483-488 |
| 40 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Andrew Gilpin,
Vincent Conitzer:
Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria.
AAAI 2005: 495-501 |
| 39 | | Makoto Yokoo,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
AAAI 2005: 509-515 |
| 38 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity of common voting rules.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87 |
| 37 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of (iterated) dominance.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97 |
| 36 | | Makoto Yokoo,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669 |
| 35 | | Makoto Yokoo,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki:
A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64 |
| 34 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators.
UAI 2005: 145-152 |
| 2004 |
|---|
| 33 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Jonathan Derryberry,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs.
AAAI 2004: 212-218 |
| 32 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains.
AAAI 2004: 219-225 |
| 31 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments.
AAMAS 2004: 128-135 |
| 30 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141 |
| 29 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263 |
| 28 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267 |
| 27 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60 |
| 26 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments.
AMEC 2004: 1-14 |
| 25 | | Paolo Santi,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract).
COLT 2004: 1-16 |
| 24 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.
ICML 2004 |
| 2003 |
|---|
| 23 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231 |
| 22 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233 |
| 21 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting.
ICEC 2003: 17-24 |
| 20 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.
ICML 2003: 83-90 |
| 19 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.
ICML 2003: 91-98 |
| 18 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.
IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106 |
| 17 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core.
IJCAI 2003: 613-618 |
| 16 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.
IJCAI 2003: 765-771 |
| 15 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.
IJCAI 2003: 781-788 |
| 14 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Jérôme Lang,
Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
TARK 2003: 201-214 |
| 13 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems
CoRR cs.AI/0307017: (2003) |
| 12 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents
CoRR cs.GT/0307002: (2003) |
| 11 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Jérôme Lang,
Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
CoRR cs.GT/0307003: (2003) |
| 10 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games
CoRR cs.GT/0307006: (2003) |
| 9 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
CoRR cs.GT/0307016: (2003) |
| 8 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard
CoRR cs.GT/0307018: (2003) |
| 2002 |
|---|
| 7 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.
AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319 |
| 6 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.
AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397 |
| 5 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design.
UAI 2002: 103-110 |
| 4 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
CoRR cs.GT/0205073: (2002) |
| 3 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
CoRR cs.GT/0205074: (2002) |
| 2 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design
CoRR cs.GT/0205075: (2002) |
| 1 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates
CoRR cs.GT/0205076: (2002) |
