 | 2009 |
| 24 |  | Taiki Todo,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai:
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions.
AAMAS (1) 2009: 265-272 |
| 23 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Yasumasa Saito,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution.
AAMAS (2) 2009: 1285-1286 |
| 22 |  | Naoki Ohta,
Vincent Conitzer,
Ryo Ichimura,
Yuko Sakurai,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations.
CP 2009: 623-638 |
| 21 |  | Yuki Iwanari,
Makoto Tasaki,
Makoto Yokoo,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Yuko Sakurai:
Introducing Communication in Dis-POMDPs with Finite State Machines.
IAT 2009: 267-270 |
| 20 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Makoto Yokoo,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Koutarou Suzuki:
Secure Keyword Auction: Preserving Privacy of Bidding Prices and CTRs.
IAT 2009: 419-422 |
| 2008 |
| 19 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Yasumasa Saito,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Beyond quasi-linear utility: strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols.
AAMAS (3) 2008: 1609-1612 |
| 18 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Keyword Auction Protocol for Dynamically Adjusting the Number of Advertisements.
IAT 2008: 410-416 |
| 17 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Yasumasa Saito,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo:
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols.
IAT 2008: 417-423 |
| 16 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Yasumasa Saito,
Makoto Yokoo:
Gsp-exr: gsp protocol with an exclusive right for keyword auctions.
WWW 2008: 1089-1090 |
| 2007 |
| 15 |  | Hiromitsu Hattori,
Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Toramatsu Shintani:
Determining bidding strategies in sequential auctions: Quasi-linear utility and budget constraints.
Systems and Computers in Japan 38(8): 72-83 (2007) |
| 2005 |
| 14 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids.
Decision Support Systems 39(2): 241-252 (2005) |
| 2003 |
| 13 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Makoto Yokoo:
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values.
AAMAS 2003: 329-336 |
| 2002 |
| 12 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Makoto Yokoo:
An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol.
AAMAS 2002: 104-111 |
| 2001 |
| 11 |  | Hiromitsu Hattori,
Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Toramatsu Shintani:
Determining bidding strategies in sequential auctions: quasi-linear utility and budget constraints.
Agents 2001: 83-84 |
| 10 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids.
ICDCS 2001: 137-145 |
| 9 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids.
IJCAI 2001: 1089-1094 |
| 8 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids.
IJCAI 2001: 1095-1101 |
| 7 |  | Hiromitsu Hattori,
Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Toramatsu Shintani:
A Dynamic Programming Model for Determining Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions: Quasi-linear Utility and Budget Constraints.
UAI 2001: 211-218 |
| 6 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artif. Intell. 130(2): 167-181 (2001) |
| 2000 |
| 5 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids.
AAAI/IAAI 2000: 110-115 |
| 4 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Makoto Yokoo,
Koji Kamei:
An efficient approximate algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2000: 30-37 |
| 3 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Makoto Yokoo,
Koji Kamei:
An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions.
CP 2000: 549-553 |
| 2 |  | Makoto Yokoo,
Yuko Sakurai,
Shigeo Matsubara:
The Effect of False-name Declarations in Mechanism Design: Towards Collective Decision Making on the Internet.
ICDCS 2000: 146-153 |
| 1999 |
| 1 |  | Yuko Sakurai,
Makoto Yokoo,
Shigeo Matsubara:
A Limitation of the Generalized Vickrey Auction in Electronic Commerce: Robustness against False-name Bids.
AAAI/IAAI 1999: 86-92 |