Volume 47, Number 1, April 2004
- Nabil I. Al-Najjar:
Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies.
- Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker:
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing.
- Bogaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv:
Observational learning under imperfect information.
- Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer:
Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions.
- Ron Holzman, Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions.
- Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals.
- Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky:
- Eilon Solan, Leeat Yariv:
Games with espionage.
- Ran Spiegler:
Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game.
- William Stanford:
Individually rational pure strategies in large games.
Volume 47, Number 2, May 2004
Last update Thu May 23 18:49:20 2013
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- Giacomo Bonanno:
Memory and perfect recall in extensive games.
- Youngsub Chun:
On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games.
- Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger:
A theory of sequential reciprocity.
- Péter Eso, James Schummer:
Bribing and signaling in second price auctions.
- Eric J. Friedman, Mikhael Shor, Scott Shenker, Barry Sopher:
An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.
- Igal Milchtaich:
- Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos:
Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games.
- Eric van Damme, Sjaak Hurkens:
Endogenous price leadership.
- Andreas Westermark:
Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity.
- Andreas Blume, Tone Arnold:
Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46(2004) 240-259].