Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 51

Volume 51, Number 1, April 2005

• Ottorino Chillemi:
  Cross-owned firms competing in auctions. 1-19
  
• Pradeep Dubey, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko:
  Compound voting and the Banzhaf index. 20-30
  
• John Duffy, Ed Hopkins:
  Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence. 31-62
  
• Toru Hokari:
  Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games. 63-82
  
• Ulrich Horst:
  Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players. 83-108
  
• Steffen Huck, Wieland Müller:
  Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction. 109-127
  
• Matthew O. Jackson:
  Allocation rules for network games. 128-154
  
• Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten:
  Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions. 155-170
  
• Reinhard Selten, Jose Apesteguia:
  Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle. 171-192
  
• René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan:
  A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure. 193-212
  
• Huseyin Yildirim:
  Contests with multiple rounds. 213-227
  
• Mark Voorneveld:
  Persistent retracts and preparation. 228-232
  

Volume 51, Number 2, May 2005

• Thomas R. Palfrey:
  Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey. 237-242
  

• Theodore L. Turocy:
  A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence. 243-263
  
• Andrew McLennan, Johannes Berg:
  Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games. 264-295
  
• James W. Friedman, Claudio Mezzetti:
  Random belief equilibrium in normal form games. 296-323
  
• Kang-Oh Yi:
  Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game. 324-348
  
• Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt:
  An experimental study of costly coordination. 349-364
  
• Guillaume Fréchette, John H. Kagel, Massimo Morelli:
  Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. 365-390
  
• Alessandra Casella:
  Storable votes. 391-419
  
• Matthew O. Jackson, Anne van den Nouweland:
  Strongly stable networks. 420-444
  
• Marco Battaglini:
  Sequential voting with abstention. 445-463
  
• Adam Meirowitz:
  Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework. 464-489
  
• John Duggan, Mark Fey:
  Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates. 490-522
  
• John Wiggs Patty:
  Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models. 523-536
  

• Dov Samet:
  Counterfactuals in wonderland. 537-541
  

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