Volume 69, Number 1, May 2010
- Pradeep Dubey, Eric Maskin, Yair Tauman:
A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday.
1
- Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg:
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents.
2-23
- James J. Anton, Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo:
Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data.
24-41
- Bernard De Meyer:
Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information.
42-71
- Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos:
Grading exams: 100, 99, 98, ... or A, B, C?
72-94
- Olivier Gossner:
Ability and knowledge.
95-106
- Sergiu Hart, Yishay Mansour:
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures.
107-126
- Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet:
A commitment folk theorem.
127-137
- Gil Kivetz, Yair Tauman:
Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions.
138-149
- Jinpeng Ma:
The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
150-164
- Abraham Neyman, Joel Spencer:
Complexity and effective prediction.
165-168
- Dov Samet:
Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case.
169-174
Notes
Volume 69, Number 2, July 2010
- Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Andrew Schotter:
Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and fixed costs.
205-223
- Gustavo Bergantiños, Anirban Kar:
On obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems.
224-237
- Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin:
Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: Beyond the Folk solution.
238-248
- Pablo Brañas-Garza, Ramón Cobo-Reyes, María Paz Espinosa Alejos, Natalia Jiménez, Jaromír Kovárík, Giovanni Ponti:
Altruism and social integration.
249-257
- Xiaoyong Cao, Guoqiang Tian:
Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs.
258-273
- Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero, Martin Sefton:
Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence.
274-292
- Robert Dur, Joeri Sol:
Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives.
293-301
- Lars Ehlers:
Manipulation via capacities revisited.
302-311
- Florian Englmaier, Achim Wambach:
Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion.
312-328
- Theresa C. Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach:
Minority voting and long-term decisions.
329-345
- David Gill, Rebecca Stone:
Fairness and desert in tournaments.
346-364
- Hanna Halaburda:
Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences.
365-393
- Yuval Heller:
Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol.
394-400
- Noemí Navarro:
Flexible network rules for identified externalities.
401-410
- Pietro Ortoleva:
Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion.
411-424
- Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver:
House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization.
425-445
- Bernhard von Stengel, Shmuel Zamir:
Leadership games with convex strategy sets.
446-457
- David H. Wolpert:
Why income comparison is rational.
458-474
- Özgür Yilmaz:
The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments.
475-491
Notes
Reviews
- William S. Zwicker:
Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano, , Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power (2008) Cambridge University Press 184 pages.
517-522
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