Volume 75, Number 1, May 2012
- Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea:
Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks.
1-16

- Franziska Barmettler, Ernst Fehr, Christian Zehnder:
Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory.
17-34

- Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott:
Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence.
35-52

- Catherine Bobtcheff, Thomas Mariotti:
Potential competition in preemption games.
53-66

- Anat Bracha, Donald J. Brown:
Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias.
67-80

- Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo:
From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes.
81-103

- Brendan Daley, Michael Schwarz, Konstantin Sonin:
Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment.
104-119

- Andrei Dubovik, Maarten C. W. Janssen:
Oligopolistic competition in price and quality.
120-138

- Eric J. Friedman:
Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms.
139-151

- Hans Peter Grüner, Yukio Koriyama:
Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem.
152-167

- Magnus Hoffmann, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi:
Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models.
168-184

- Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem.
185-197

- Matthew O. Jackson, Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Xu Tan:
Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games.
198-216

- Chiu Yu Ko, Hideo Konishi:
Profit-maximizing matchmaker.
217-232

- Nenad Kos:
Communication and efficiency in auctions.
233-249

- Vincent Mak, Amnon Rapoport, Eyran J. Gisches:
Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment.
250-264

- Priscilla T. Y. Man:
Forward induction equilibrium.
265-276

- V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis:
Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample.
277-282

- Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen:
Roberts' Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach.
283-298

- Erik Mohlin:
Evolution of theories of mind.
299-318

- Arjan Non:
Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers.
319-336

- Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal:
Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes.
337-353

- Aric P. Shafran:
Learning in games with risky payoffs.
354-371

- Mathias Staudigl:
Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games.
372-401

- Christian Trudeau:
A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems.
402-412

Notes
Volume 75, Number 2, July 2012
- Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter, Chloe Tergiman:
Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study.
449-463

- Enriqueta Aragonès, Dimitrios Xefteris:
Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space.
464-480

- Aurélien Baillon, Bram Driesen, Peter P. Wakker:
Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity.
481-489

- Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
490-509

- Andreas Blume:
A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games.
510-517

- Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed:
Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design.
518-537

- Leonardo Boncinelli, Paolo Pin:
Stochastic stability in best shot network games.
538-554

- Yves Breitmoser:
Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests.
555-569

- Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni:
Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment.
570-586

- Yi-Chun Chen:
A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games.
587-597

- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kunal Sengupta:
Transparency, complementarity and holdout.
598-612

- Daniele Condorelli:
What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals.
613-624

- Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch, Jean-Philippe Lefort:
A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment.
625-638

- John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica, Scott Duke Kominers:
Testing substitutability.
639-645

- Patrick Hummel:
Deliberative democracy and electoral competition.
646-667

- Pedro Jara-Moroni:
Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players.
668-684

- Fuhito Kojima:
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action.
685-693

- Michael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Mauro Napoletano, Frank Schweitzer:
The efficiency and stability of R&D networks.
694-713

- Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim:
On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations.
714-730

- Bernard Lebrun:
Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale.
731-751

- Marc Lelarge:
Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks.
752-775

- Dunia López-Pintado:
Influence networks.
776-787

- Jason R. Marden, Jeff S. Shamma:
Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation.
788-808

- Igal Milchtaich:
Comparative statics of altruism and spite.
809-831

- Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, John E. Roemer:
A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism.
832-841

- Jonathan Newton:
Coalitional stochastic stability.
842-854

- Carlos Oyarzun, Rajiv Sarin:
Mean and variance responsive learning.
855-866

- Cameron Parker:
The influence relation for ternary voting games.
867-881

- Bary S. R. Pradelski, H. Peyton Young:
Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems.
882-897

- Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utz Weitzel:
Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis.
898-920

- Leonidas Spiliopoulos:
Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game.
921-935

- Peter Troyan:
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare.
936-947

- Rodrigo A. Velez, William Thomson:
Let them cheat!
948-963

- Rui R. Zhao:
Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting.
964-983

Notes
- Scott Duke Kominers:
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching.
984-989

- Laurent Lamy:
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts.
990-999

- Petra Nieken, Patrick W. Schmitz:
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment.
1000-1008

- Toru Suzuki:
Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes.
1009-1013

- Simon Weidenholzer:
Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions.
1014-1024

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