Volume 75, Number 1, May 2012
- Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea:
Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks.
1-16
- Franziska Barmettler, Ernst Fehr, Christian Zehnder:
Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory.
17-34
- Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott:
Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence.
35-52
- Catherine Bobtcheff, Thomas Mariotti:
Potential competition in preemption games.
53-66
- Anat Bracha, Donald J. Brown:
Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias.
67-80
- Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo:
From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes.
81-103
- Brendan Daley, Michael Schwarz, Konstantin Sonin:
Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment.
104-119
- Andrei Dubovik, Maarten C. W. Janssen:
Oligopolistic competition in price and quality.
120-138
- Eric J. Friedman:
Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms.
139-151
- Hans Peter Grüner, Yukio Koriyama:
Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem.
152-167
- Magnus Hoffmann, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi:
Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models.
168-184
- Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem.
185-197
- Matthew O. Jackson, Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Xu Tan:
Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games.
198-216
- Chiu Yu Ko, Hideo Konishi:
Profit-maximizing matchmaker.
217-232
- Nenad Kos:
Communication and efficiency in auctions.
233-249
- Vincent Mak, Amnon Rapoport, Eyran J. Gisches:
Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment.
250-264
- Priscilla T. Y. Man:
Forward induction equilibrium.
265-276
- V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis:
Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample.
277-282
- Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen:
Roberts' Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach.
283-298
- Erik Mohlin:
Evolution of theories of mind.
299-318
- Arjan Non:
Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers.
319-336
- Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal:
Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes.
337-353
- Aric P. Shafran:
Learning in games with risky payoffs.
354-371
- Mathias Staudigl:
Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games.
372-401
- Christian Trudeau:
A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems.
402-412
Notes
Volume 75, Number 2, July 2012
- Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter, Chloe Tergiman:
Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study.
449-463
- Enriqueta Aragonès, Dimitrios Xefteris:
Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space.
464-480
- Aurélien Baillon, Bram Driesen, Peter P. Wakker:
Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity.
481-489
- Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
490-509
- Andreas Blume:
A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games.
510-517
- Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed:
Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design.
518-537
- Leonardo Boncinelli, Paolo Pin:
Stochastic stability in best shot network games.
538-554
- Yves Breitmoser:
Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests.
555-569
- Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni:
Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment.
570-586
- Yi-Chun Chen:
A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games.
587-597
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kunal Sengupta:
Transparency, complementarity and holdout.
598-612
- Daniele Condorelli:
What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals.
613-624
- Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch, Jean-Philippe Lefort:
A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment.
625-638
- John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica, Scott Duke Kominers:
Testing substitutability.
639-645
- Patrick Hummel:
Deliberative democracy and electoral competition.
646-667
- Pedro Jara-Moroni:
Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players.
668-684
- Fuhito Kojima:
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action.
685-693
- Michael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Mauro Napoletano, Frank Schweitzer:
The efficiency and stability of R&D networks.
694-713
- Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim:
On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations.
714-730
- Bernard Lebrun:
Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale.
731-751
- Marc Lelarge:
Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks.
752-775
- Dunia López-Pintado:
Influence networks.
776-787
- Jason R. Marden, Jeff S. Shamma:
Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation.
788-808
- Igal Milchtaich:
Comparative statics of altruism and spite.
809-831
- Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, John E. Roemer:
A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism.
832-841
- Jonathan Newton:
Coalitional stochastic stability.
842-854
- Carlos Oyarzun, Rajiv Sarin:
Mean and variance responsive learning.
855-866
- Cameron Parker:
The influence relation for ternary voting games.
867-881
- Bary S. R. Pradelski, H. Peyton Young:
Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems.
882-897
- Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utz Weitzel:
Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis.
898-920
- Leonidas Spiliopoulos:
Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game.
921-935
- Peter Troyan:
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare.
936-947
- Rodrigo A. Velez, William Thomson:
Let them cheat!
948-963
- Rui R. Zhao:
Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting.
964-983
Notes
- Scott Duke Kominers:
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching.
984-989
- Laurent Lamy:
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts.
990-999
- Petra Nieken, Patrick W. Schmitz:
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment.
1000-1008
- Toru Suzuki:
Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes.
1009-1013
- Simon Weidenholzer:
Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions.
1014-1024
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