International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 29

Volume 29, Number 1, February 2000

Emilio Calvo, Juan Carlos Santos:
Weighted weak semivalues. 1-9
Amit K. Biswas, G. Ravindran, T. Parthasarathy:
Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games. 11-22
Jean Derks, Hans Haller, Hans Peters:
The selectope for cooperative games. 23-38
Joachim Rosenmüller, Benyamin Shitovitz:
A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games. 39-61
Oscar Volij:
Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information. 63-79
Emilio Calvo, Hans Peters:
Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution. 81-92
Edward M. Bolger:
A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives. 93-99
Horst Raff, David Schmidt:
Cumbersome coordination in repeated games. 101-118
Mehmet Bac:
A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power. 119-126
Andrzej S. Nowak, Tadeusz Radzik:
An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value. 127-132
Toru Hokari:
The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games. 133-137
Elisenda Molina, Juan Tejada:
The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus. 139-142

Johan Stennek:
The survival value of assuming others to be rational. 147-163
Diane J. Reyniers:
Relative impatience determines preference between contract bargaining and repeated bargaining. 165-176
Emilio Calvo, Esther Gutiérrez, Juan Carlos Santos:
The multichoice consistent value. 177-188
Ady Pauzner:
Independent mistakes in large games. 189-209
Tadeusz Radzik:
Characterization of optimal strategies in matrix games with convexity properties. 211-227
Ruqu Wang:
Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty. 229-240
Marco Slikker:
Inheritance of properties in communication situations. 241-268
Jonathan Shalev:
Loss aversion equilibrium. 269-287
Thomas S. Ferguson, Costis Melolidakis:
Games with finite resources. 289-303

Abraham Neyman, Daijiro Okada:
Two-person repeated games with finite automata. 309-325
Toru Hokari:
Population monotonic solutions on convex games. 327-338
Licun Xue:
Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium. 339-357
Jean-Pierre Beaud, Sylvain Sorin:
Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies. 359-364
Shinji Ohseto:
Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains. 365-374
Hans Keiding, Bezalel Peleg:
Correlated equilibria of games with many players. 375-389
Anton Stefanescu:
Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies. 391-412
Gustavo E. Rodriguez:
First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness. 413-432
Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, Mathijs Jansen, Dries Vermeulen:
Player splitting in extensive form games. 433-450
Ori Haimanko:
Value theory without symmetry. 451-468

Emilio Calvo, Iñaki Garci'a, José Manuel Zarzuelo:
Replication invariance on NTU games. 473-486
Katarína Cechlárová, Antonio Romero-Medina:
Stability in coalition formation games. 487-494
Kenneth Clark, Stephen Kay, Martin Sefton:
When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis. 495-515
Gérard Hamiache:
The Owen value values friendship. 517-532
Shmuel Gal:
On the optimality of a simple strategy for searching graphs. 533-542
Ron Holzman:
The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets. 543-553
Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander:
Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility. 555-569
Dieter Balkenborg, Karl H. Schlag:
Evolutionarily stable sets. 571-595
Yan-An Hwang, Peter Sudhölter:
Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains. 597-623

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