Volume 29, Number 1, February 2000
: Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information.
Edward M. Bolger
: A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives.
: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power.
: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games.
Volume 29, Number 2, July 2000
: The survival value of assuming others to be rational.
Diane J. Reyniers
: Relative impatience determines preference between contract bargaining and repeated bargaining.
: Independent mistakes in large games.
: Characterization of optimal strategies in matrix games with convexity properties.
: Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty.
: Inheritance of properties in communication situations.
Volume 29, Number 3, November 2000
: Population monotonic solutions on convex games.
: Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium.
: Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains.
: Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies.
Volume 29, Number 4, May 2001
: On the optimality of a simple strategy for searching graphs.
: The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.