Volume 29, Number 1, February 2000
- Emilio Calvo, Juan Carlos Santos:
Weighted weak semivalues.
- Amit K. Biswas, G. Ravindran, T. Parthasarathy:
Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games.
- Jean Derks, Hans Haller, Hans Peters:
The selectope for cooperative games.
- Joachim Rosenmüller, Benyamin Shitovitz:
A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games.
- Oscar Volij:
Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information.
- Emilio Calvo, Hans Peters:
Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution.
- Edward M. Bolger:
A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives.
- Horst Raff, David Schmidt:
Cumbersome coordination in repeated games.
- Mehmet Bac:
A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power.
- Andrzej S. Nowak, Tadeusz Radzik:
An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value.
- Toru Hokari:
The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games.
- Elisenda Molina, Juan Tejada:
The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus.
Volume 29, Number 2, July 2000
Volume 29, Number 3, November 2000
Volume 29, Number 4, May 2001
Last update Thu May 23 18:55:22 2013
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