International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 32

Volume 32, Number 1, December 2003

Sylvain Sorin:
Preface. 1
Michel Benaïm, Gerard Ben Arous:
A two armed bandit type problem. 3-16
Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini, Shmuel Zamir:
Positive value of information in games. 17-31
Pierre Cardaliaguet, Slawomir Plaskacz:
Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback for a simple nonzero-sum differential game. 33-71
Jean-Michel Coulomb:
Stochastic games without perfect monitoring. 73-96
Ashok P. Maitra, William D. Sudderth:
Borel stay-in-a-set games. 97-108
Jean-François Mertens, Abraham Neyman:
A value on 'AN. 109-120
Andrzej S. Nowak:
On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points. 121-132
Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille:
The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring. 133-150
Alvaro Sandroni:
The reproducible properties of correct forecasts. 151-159
A. J. Vermeulen, M. J. M. Jansen, Jos A. M. Potters:
Making solutions invariant. 161-180

Rafael Amer, Jean Derks, José Miguel Giménez:
On cooperative games, inseparable by semivalues. 181-188
Yevgenia Apartsin, Ron Holzman:
The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games. 189-204
Vitaly Pruzhansky:
On finding curb sets in extensive games. 205-210
Juan Carlos Cesco:
Fundamental cycles of pre-imputations in non-balanced TU-games. 211-221
Anna B. Khmelnitskaya:
Shapley value for constant-sum games. 223-227
Wojciech Polowczuk:
Pure Nash equilibria in finite two-person non-zero-sum games. 229-240
Marilda Sotomayor:
Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism. 241-251
Chih Chang, Yan-An Hwang:
The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions. 253-271
Robert W. Rosenthal, Jason Shachat, Mark Walker:
Hide and seek in Arizona. 273-293
YunTong Wang:
Simple random order methods to share costs. 295-314

Stefano Demichelis, Klaus Ritzberger, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
The simple geometry of perfect information games. 315-338
Srihari Govindan, Jean-François Mertens:
An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria. 339-357
Srihari Govindan, Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel:
Symmetry and p-Stability. 359-369
John Hillas, Mathijs Jansen, Jos A. M. Potters, Dries Vermeulen:
Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof. 371-377
Jean-François Mertens:
Localization of the degree on lower-dimensional sets. 379-386
Jean-François Mertens:
Ordinality in non cooperative games. 387-430

Kiho Yoon:
The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games. 431-442
Robert Nau, Sabrina Gomez Canovas, Pierre Hansen:
On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria. 443-453
Kislaya Prasad:
Observation, Measurement, and Computation in Finite Games. 455-470
Burkhard C. Schipper:
Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior. 471-477
Takuya Masuzawa:
Punishment strategies make the a-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced. 479-483
Elena Yanovskaya:
Consistent and covariant solutions for TU games. 485-500
Eric J. Friedman:
Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing. 501-518
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch:
Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures. 519-531
Gérard Hamiache:
A mean value for games with communication structures. 533-544
Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus:
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems. 545-560
Alberto Bressan, Wen Shen:
Semi-cooperative strategies for differential games. 561-593
Judith Timmer, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs:
On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs. 595-613

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