Volume 3,
Number 1,
July 1982
- Eitan Muller:
On the existence of an arrow and a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.
1-7
- Norman Schofield:
Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments.
9-32
- Murray C. Kemp, Yew-Kwang Ng:
The incompatibility of individualism and ordinalism.
33-37
- A. A. J. Marley:
Random utility models with all choice probabilities expressible as 'functions' of the binary choice probabilities.
39-56
- Thomas Schwartz:
No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof.
57-72
- Peter C. Fishburn:
Relative probabilities of majority winners under partial information.
73-78
- Jean-Pierre Barthélemy:
Arrow's theorem: unusual domains and extended codomains.
79-89
Volume 3,
Number 2,
September 1982
- Ki Hang Kim:
Juche in international trade.
99-107
- David J. Mayston:
The generation of a social welfare function under ordinal preferences.
109-129
- Kotaro Suzumura:
Equity, efficiency and rights in social choice.
131-155
- Alvin E. Roth, Michael W. K. Malouf:
Scale changes and shared information in bargaining: An experimental study.
157-177
- John C. Harsanyi:
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part I : Theoretical preliminaries.
179-191
- Mamoru Kaneko:
The optimal progressive income tax : The existence and the limit tax rates.
193-221
Volume 3,
Number 3,
October 1982
Volume 3,
Number 4,
December 1982
Copyright © Thu Dec 10 20:25:33 2009
by Michael Ley (ley@uni-trier.de)
