Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 63

Volume 63, Number 1, January 2012

• Theresa C. Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach:
  Preferences for harmony and minority voting. 1-13
  
• Gerald Pech:
  Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems. 14-22
  
• Junnosuke Shino, Ryo Kawasaki:
  Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games. 23-30
  
• Toshimasa Maruta, Akira Okada:
  Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games. 31-42
  
• Ryo Nagata:
  Organizational dynamics with symmetric responses of members. 43-49
  
• Alfred Greiner:
  Transition dynamics in an AK growth model under wage rigidity. 50-56
  
• Luc Doyen, Jean-Christophe Péreau:
  Sustainable coalitions in the commons. 57-64
  

Volume 63, Number 2, March 2012

• Jean-François Laslier:
  Introduction to the Special Issue 'Around the Cambridge Compromise: Apportionment in theory and practice'. 65-67
  
• Geoffrey R. Grimmett:
  European apportionment via the Cambridge Compromise. 68-73
  
• Andrew Duff:
  Finding the balance of power in a post-national democracy. 74-77
  
• Axel Moberg:
  EP seats: The politics behind the math. 78-84
  
• Richard Rose, Patrick Bernhagen, Gabriela Borz:
  Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats. 85-89
  
• Jean-François Laslier:
  Why not proportional? 90-93
  
• Wojciech Slomczynski, Karol Zyczkowski:
  Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality. 94-101
  
• Thomas Kellermann:
  The minimum-based procedure: A principled way to allocate seats in the European Parliament. 102-106
  
• Paolo Serafini:
  Allocation of the EU Parliament seats via integer linear programming and revised quotas. 107-113
  
• V. Ramírez-González, José Martínez-Aroza, A. Márquez García:
  Spline methods for degressive proportionality in the composition of the European Parliament. 114-120
  
• Jan Florek:
  A numerical method to determine a degressive proportional distribution of seats in the European Parliament. 121-129
  
• Victoriano Ramírez-González:
  Seat distribution in the European Parliament according to the Treaty of Lisbon. 130-135
  
• Geoffrey R. Grimmett, K.-F. Oelbermann, Friedrich Pukelsheim:
  A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Compromise. 136-140
  
• Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich:
  Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment. 141-151
  
• László Á. Kóczy:
  Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers. 152-158
  
• Michel Le Breton, Maria Montero, Vera Zaporozhets:
  Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics. 159-173
  
• Nicola Maaser, Stefan Napel:
  A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting. 174-180
  
• Gabrielle Demange:
  On party-proportional representation under district distortions. 181-191
  

Volume 63, Number 3, May 2012

• Wulf Gaertner, Yongsheng Xu:
  A general scoring rule. 193-196
  
• Bertrand Crettez, Lisa Morhaim:
  Existence of competitive equilibrium in a non-optimal one-sector economy without conditions on the distorted marginal product of capital. 197-206
  
• Xing Gao, Weijun Zhong, Shue Mei:
  On local stability of Cournot models with simultaneous and sequential decisions. 207-212
  
• Christophe Courbage, Béatrice Rey:
  Optimal prevention and other risks in a two-period model. 213-217
  
• Michael R. Caputo, Amnon Levy:
  A theory of mood-influenced consumption and investment in health. 218-227
  
• Itai Ashlagi, Emin Karagözoglu, Bettina Klaus:
  A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems. 228-233
  
• Kaname Miyagishima:
  Ranking linear budget sets with different available goods: A note. 234-238
  
• Vikram Manjunath:
  Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives. 239-242
  
• Junichiro Wada:
  A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm-Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy. 243-247
  
• Ming-Hung Weng:
  Demand structure and the incentive to innovate. 248-251
  
• André Lapied, Pascal Toquebeuf:
  Dynamically consistent CEU preferences on f-convex events. 252-256
  

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