Synthese, Volume 152

Volume 152, Number 1, September 2006

• Eric Winsberg:
  Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth. 1-19
  
• Benjamin Schnieder:
  Truth-Making without Truth-Makers. 21-46
  
• Berit Brogaard:
  The 'Gray's Elegy' Argument, and The Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts. 47-79
  
• R. Otte:
  Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability. 81-93
  
• Robert Eamon Briscoe:
  Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning. 95-128
  
• Horacio L. Arló-Costa, Isaac Levi:
  Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment. 129-154
  
• Sandra Lapointe:
  Erratum. 155
  

Volume 152, Number 2, September 2006

• Katie Atkinson, Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon, Peter McBurney:
  Computational Representation of Practical Argument. 157-206
  
• Ulrike Hahn, Mike Oaksford:
  A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. 207-236
  
• Douglas Walton:
  Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question. 237-284
  
• Gabriella Pigozzi:
  Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation. 285-298
  

Volume 152, Number 3, October 2006

• Adrian Bardon:
  Introduction. 299-300
  
• Don Garrett:
  Hume's naturalistic theory of representation. 301-319
  
• Louis E. Loeb:
  Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume's argument about induction. 321-338
  
• Barry Stroud:
  The constraints of Hume's naturalism. 339-351
  
• Elizabeth S. Radcliffe:
  Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume's metaethics. 353-370
  
• Gerald J. Postema:
  Whence avidity? Hume's psychology and the origins of justice. 371-391
  
• Jane L. Mcintyre:
  Strength of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account. 393-401