Volume 152, Number 1, September 2006
: Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth.
: The 'Gray's Elegy' Argument, and The Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts.
: Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability.
Volume 152, Number 2, September 2006
Knowledge, Rationality & Action
: Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question.
: Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation.
Volume 152, Number 3, October 2006
: Hume's naturalistic theory of representation.
Louis E. Loeb
: Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume's argument about induction.
Gerald J. Postema
: Whence avidity? Hume's psychology and the origins of justice.
Jane L. Mcintyre
: Strength of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account.