Synthese, Volume 158

Volume 158, Number 1, September 2007

• Elaine Landry:
  Shared structure need not be shared set-structure. 1-17
  
• Peter J. Graham:
  The theoretical diagnosis of skepticism. 19-39
  
• Leon Horsten, Philip Welch:
  The Undecidability of Propositional Adaptive Logic. 41-60
  
• K. Brad Wray:
  Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited. 61-73
  
• Sjoerd D. Zwart, Maarten Franssen:
  An impossibility theorem for verisimilitude. 75-92
  
• Matthias Adam:
  Two Notions of Scientific Justification. 93-108
  
• Fred Keijzer, Maurice Schouten:
  Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. 109-125
  
• Philippe Schlenker:
  How to eliminate self-reference: a précis. 127-138
  
• Ken Levy:
  Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case probabilities. 139-151
  

Volume 158, Number 2, September 2007

• Jan Plaza:
  Logics of public communications. 165-179
  
• Hans P. van Ditmarsch:
  Comments to 'logics of public communications'. 181-187
  
• Katie Steele:
  Distinguishing indeterminate belief from "risk-averse" preferences. 189-205
  
• Jesse Hughes, Peter Kroes, Sjoerd Zwart:
  A Semantics for Means-end Relations. 207-231
  
• Marc Pauly:
  Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language. 233-250
  
• Andrés Perea:
  A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies. 251-271
  

Volume 158, Number 3, October 2007

• Duncan Pritchard:
  Introduction. 273-275
  
• Duncan Pritchard:
  Anti-luck epistemology. 277-297
  
• John Greco:
  Worries about Pritchard's safety. 299-302
  
• Avram Hiller, Ram Neta:
  Safety and epistemic luck. 303-313
  
• Sanford Goldberg:
  How lucky can you get? 315-327
  
• Wayne Riggs:
  Why epistemologists are so down on their luck. 329-344
  
• Jennifer Lackey:
  Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know. 345-361
  
• Guy Axtell:
  Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance. 363-383
  
• E. J. Coffman:
  Thinking about luck. 385-398