Synthese, Volume 167

Volume 167, Number 1, March 2009

• Tomasz Placek, Leszek Wronski:
  On infinite EPR-like correlations. 1-32
  
• Katherine Dunlop:
  Why Euclid's geometry brooked no doubt: J. H. Lambert on certainty and the existence of models. 33-65
  
• Tracy Lupher:
  A physical critique of physical causation. 67-80
  
• Rachael Briggs:
  The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance. 81-92
  
• Peter Verdée:
  Adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are P¹₁\Pi^1_1 -complex. 93-104
  
• Mark Textor:
  A repair of Frege's theory of thoughts. 105-123
  
• Jonathan Weisberg:
  Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework. 125-143
  
• Colin Johnston:
  Tractarian objects and logical categories. 145-161
  
• Matthew William McKeon:
  A plea for logical objects. 163-182
  
• Robert Kowalenko:
  How (not) to think about idealisation and ceteris paribus -laws. 183-201
  

Volume 167, Number 2, March 2009

• Luciano Floridi, Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson:
  Introduction. 203-205
  
• Samson Abramsky, Jouko Väänänen:
  From IF to BI. 207-230
  
• Patrick Allo:
  Reasoning about data and information. 231-249
  
• Johan van Benthem:
  The information in intuitionistic logic. 251-270
  
• Marcello D'Agostino, Luciano Floridi:
  The enduring scandal of deduction. 271-315
  
• Luciano Floridi:
  Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts. 317-325
  
• Mark Jago:
  Logical information and epistemic space. 327-341
  
• Edwin D. Mares:
  General information in relevant logic. 343-362
  
• Giuseppe Primiero:
  An epistemic logic for becoming informed. 363-389
  
• Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh:
  Ockham's razor and reasoning about information flow. 391-408
  
• Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson:
  A positive information logic for inferential information. 409-431
  

Volume 167, Number 3, April 2009

• Kenneth Aizawa:
  Editor's introduction. 433-438
  
• Lawrence Shapiro:
  Making sense of mirror neurons. 439-456
  
• Thomas W. Polger:
  Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization. 457-472
  
• Robert C. Richardson:
  Multiple realization and methodological pluralism. 473-492
  
• Ken Aizawa:
  Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale. 493-510
  
• Jacqueline A. Sullivan:
  The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to reductionist and non-reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience. 511-539