Vincent Conitzer

Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer: Undominated Groves Mechanisms. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 46: 129-163 (2013)

Vincent Conitzer, R. Preston McAfee: The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(1): 1 (2013)

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition. Int. J. Game Theory 41(1): 91-129 (2012)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 2-14 (2012)

Vincent Conitzer, Curtis R. Taylor, Liad Wagman: Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases. Marketing Science 31(2): 277-292 (2012)

Vincent Conitzer: Should social network structure be taken into account in elections? Mathematical Social Sciences 64(1): 100-102 (2012)

Vincent Conitzer: Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security. AAAI 2012

Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, Charles L. Isbell: Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games. AAAI 2012

Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections. AAAI 2012

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Approximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains. ISAIM 2012

Vincent Conitzer, Lirong Xia: Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach. KR 2012

Sayan Bhattacharya, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer: Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network. WINE 2012: 482-488

Wiebe van der Hoek, Lin Padgham, Vincent Conitzer, Michael Winikoff (Eds.): International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2012, Valencia, Spain, June 4-8, 2012 (3 Volumes). IFAAMAS 2012

Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer: Undominated Groves Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1203.1809 (2012)

Vincent Conitzer: Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory. CoRR abs/1205.2654 (2012)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. CoRR abs/1207.1368 (2012)

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal. CoRR abs/1208.6501 (2012)

Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer: Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 22(1): 127-150 (2011)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive markets for donating to charities. Artif. Intell. 175(7-8): 1251-1271 (2011)

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 41: 25-67 (2011)

Dmytro Korzhyk, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, Milind Tambe: Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 41: 297-327 (2011)

Vincent Conitzer: Discussion of "A conditional game for comparing approximations". Journal of Machine Learning Research - Proceedings Track 15: 72-73 (2011)

Vincent Conitzer, Dmytro Korzhyk: Commitment to Correlated Strategies. AAAI 2011

Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia: Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information. AAAI 2011

Manish Jain, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, Milind Tambe: A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs. AAMAS 2011: 327-334

Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr: Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability. AAMAS 2011: 1013-1020

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia: Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains. IJCAI 2011: 158-163

Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr: Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources. IJCAI 2011: 273-279

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders. IJCAI 2011: 446-451

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang: Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 179-188

Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala: Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources. WINE 2011: 13-24

Mingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer, Amy Greenwald, Nicholas R. Jennings: Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond. WINE 2011: 158-169

Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Vincent Conitzer, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein: An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections. WINE 2011: 363-374

Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia: Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information. CoRR abs/1106.5448 (2011)

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. Artif. Intell. 174(5-6): 363-381 (2010)

Vincent Conitzer, Makoto Yokoo: Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations. AI Magazine 31(4): 65-78 (2010)

Vincent Conitzer: Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 58(3-4): 239-259 (2010)

Vincent Conitzer: Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents. Commun. ACM 53(3): 84-94 (2010)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 9(1): 1 (2010)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: borrowing as cheaply as possible. SIGecom Exchanges 9(1): 9 (2010)

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies. AAAI 2010

Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr: Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games. AAAI 2010

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules. AAAI 2010

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. AAAI 2010

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang: Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators. AAMAS 2010: 399-408

Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo: Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 633-640

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors. AAMAS 2010: 881-888

Zhengyu Yin, Dmytro Korzhyk, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, Milind Tambe: Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. AAMAS 2010: 1139-1146

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal. AAMAS 2010: 1475-1476

Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer: Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 83-92

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel D. Procaccia: A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 275-284

Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia: Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. SODA 2010: 554-572

Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchford, Kamesh Munagala, Liad Wagman: False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks. WINE 2010: 209-221

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences. WINE 2010: 402-414

Razvan C. Bunescu, Vitor R. Carvalho, Jan Chomicki, Vincent Conitzer, Michael T. Cox, Virginia Dignum, Zachary Dodds, Mark Dredze, David Furcy, Evgeniy Gabrilovich, Mehmet H. Göker, Hans W. Guesgen, Haym Hirsh, Dietmar Jannach, Ulrich Junker, Wolfgang Ketter, Alfred Kobsa, Sven Koenig, Tessa A. Lau, Lundy Lewis, Eric T. Matson, Ted Metzler, Rada Mihalcea, Bamshad Mobasher, Joelle Pineau, Pascal Poupart, Anita Raja, Wheeler Ruml, Norman M. Sadeh, Guy Shani, Daniel G. Shapiro, Sarabjot Singh Anand, Matthew E. Taylor, Kiri Wagstaff, Trey Smith, William E. Walsh, Ron Zhou: AAAI 2008 Workshop Reports. AI Magazine 30(1): 108-118 (2009)

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 67(1): 69-98 (2009)

Vincent Conitzer: Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 35: 161-191 (2009)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 8(1) (2009)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: identifying the champion. SIGecom Exchanges 8(1) (2009)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 8(2): 1 (2009)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: a dutch dutch auction clock auction. SIGecom Exchanges 8(2): 10 (2009)

Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer: Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market. AMMA 2009: 61-73

Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer: A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market. AAMAS (2) 2009: 1407-1408

Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. CP 2009: 623-638

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia: How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda? IJCAI 2009: 103-108

Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie, Lirong Xia: Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. IJCAI 2009: 109-115

Erik Halvorson, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr: Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games. IJCAI 2009: 159-166

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules. IJCAI 2009: 336-341

Lirong Xia, Michael Zuckerman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Vincent Conitzer, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein: Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules. IJCAI 2009: 348-353

Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala: Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. SAGT 2009: 250-262

Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conitzer: A qualitative vickrey auction. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 197-206

Vincent Conitzer: Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory. UAI 2009: 101-108

Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo: Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. WINE 2009: 89-100

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves: Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. WINE 2009: 244-255

Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia: Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. CoRR abs/0904.3501 (2009)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: New complexity results about Nash equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 63(2): 621-641 (2008)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2) (2008)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: strategically choosing products to release. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2) (2008)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 7(3) (2008)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: product adoption in a social network. SIGecom Exchanges 7(3) (2008)

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. AAAI 2008: 190-195

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. AAAI 2008: 196-201

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang: Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. AAAI 2008: 202-207

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Strategic betting for competitive agents. AAMAS (2) 2008: 847-854

Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 927-934

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1039-1046

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1047-1054

Vincent Conitzer: Comparing Multiagent Systems Research in Combinatorial Auctions and Voting. ISAIM 2008

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 99-108

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 109-118

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 210-219

Vincent Conitzer: Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. WINE 2008: 295-306

Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis: Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. WINE 2008: 426-437

Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamal Jain: An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. WINE 2008: 696-707

Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis: Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. CoRR abs/0810.2865 (2008)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 1-2 (2007)

Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination. SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 69-70 (2007)

Vincent Conitzer: Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. AAMAS 2007: 65

Vincent Conitzer: Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. AAMAS 2007: 253

Vincent Conitzer: Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007

Vincent Conitzer: Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Incremental Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256

Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier: Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 30-39

Vincent Conitzer: Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness. TARK 2007: 102-111

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006)

Vincent Conitzer: Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. AAAI 2006: 613-619

Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam: Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. AAAI 2006: 620-626

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006: 627-634

Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006: 697-702

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544

Vincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera: Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). ICML 2006: 209-216

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi: Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488

Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer: Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501

Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515

Vincent Conitzer: Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. AAAI 2005: 1642-1643

Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669

Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity of common voting rules. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of (iterated) dominance. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152

Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm: Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135

Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. IJCAI 2003: 765-771

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. CoRR cs.AI/0307017 (2003)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. CoRR cs.GT/0307002 (2003)

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003 (2003)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. CoRR cs.GT/0307006 (2003)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. CoRR cs.GT/0307016 (2003)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. CoRR cs.GT/0307018 (2003)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design. UAI 2002: 103-110

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. CoRR cs.GT/0205073 (2002)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. CoRR cs.GT/0205074 (2002)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design. CoRR cs.GT/0205075 (2002)

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. CoRR cs.GT/0205076 (2002)