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 | 2013 | |
|---|---|---|
| j21 |      | Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Adversarial Leakage in Games. SIAM J. Discrete Math. 27(1): 363-385 (2013) |
| i11 | | Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier: Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1304.2244 (2013) |
| 2012 | ||
| j20 | | Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason A. Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher M. Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein: On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections. Artif. Intell. 187: 31-51 (2012) |
| j19 | | Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir: Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. Operations Research 60(3): 529-540 (2012) |
| j18 | | Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, Eyal Winter: Combinatorial agency. J. Economic Theory 147(3): 999-1034 (2012) |
| j17 | | Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. SIAM J. Comput. 41(1): 12-25 (2012) |
| j16 | | Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Bayesian ignorance. Theor. Comput. Sci. 452: 1-11 (2012) |
| j15 | | Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman: Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies. Theor. Comput. Sci. 452: 56-74 (2012) |
| c35 | | Steven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia: On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions. AAAI 2012 |
| c34 | | Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz: Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability. AAMAS 2012: 771-778 |
| c33 | | Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz, Michal Feldman: Mastering multi-player games. AAMAS 2012: 897-904 |
| c32 | | Michal Feldman, John K. Lai: Mechanisms and Impossibilities for Truthful, Envy-Free Allocations. SAGT 2012: 120-131 |
| c31 | | |
| c30 | | Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama: Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 423-440 |
| c29 | | Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz: Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 514-531 |
| c28 | | Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski: Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 532-549 |
| c27 | | Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir: Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects. WINE 2012: 496-503 |
| i10 | | Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz: Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization. CoRR abs/1202.1590 (2012) |
| i9 | | Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. CoRR abs/1202.3700 (2012) |
| i8 | | Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier: Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient. CoRR abs/1209.4703 (2012) |
| 2011 | ||
| c26 | | Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Economical Graph Discovery. ICS 2011: 476-486 |
| c25 | | Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman, Mishael Rosenthal: Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability. SAGT 2011: 57-68 |
| c24 | | Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. UAI 2011: 27-34 |
| c23 | | Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing. WINE 2011: 97-108 |
| c22 | | Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz: Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. WINE 2011: 391-398 |
| i7 | | Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz: Stability Scores: Stability and Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. CoRR abs/1105.5983 (2011) |
| i6 | | Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf: Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location and the Mini-Sum-of-Squares Objective. CoRR abs/1108.1762 (2011) |
| 2010 | ||
| j14 | | Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz: Walking in circles. Discrete Mathematics 310(23): 3432-3435 (2010) |
| j13 | | Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz: A note on competitive diffusion through social networks. Inf. Process. Lett. 110(6): 221-225 (2010) |
| j12 | | Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan: Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 38: 339-369 (2010) |
| j11 | | Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz: Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks. Math. Oper. Res. 35(3): 513-526 (2010) |
| j10 | | Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Structured coalitions in resource selection games. ACM TIST 1(1): 4 (2010) |
| c21 | | Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz: Playing Games without Observing Payoffs. ICS 2010: 106-110 |
| c20 | | Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz: Adversarial Leakage in Games. ICS 2010: 111-119 |
| c19 | | |
| c18 | | Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 159-166 |
| i5 | | Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games. CoRR abs/1003.5326 (2010) |
| i4 | | Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness. CoRR abs/1003.5328 (2010) |
| 2009 | ||
| j9 | | Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Strong price of anarchy. Games and Economic Behavior 65(2): 289-317 (2009) |
| j8 | | Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Efficient graph topologies in network routing games. Games and Economic Behavior 66(1): 115-125 (2009) |
| j7 | | Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. Games and Economic Behavior 67(1): 51-68 (2009) |
| j6 | | Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir: Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 36: 387-414 (2009) |
| j5 | | |
| j4 | | Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang: The Proportional-Share Allocation Market for Computational Resources. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 20(8): 1075-1088 (2009) |
| c17 | | |
| c16 | | Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan: Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency. SAGT 2009: 109-121 |
| c15 | | Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason A. Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher M. Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein: On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections. SODA 2009: 1058-1067 |
| c14 | | Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman: Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies. WINE 2009: 268-279 |
| c13 | | Michal Feldman, Ran Tessler, Yoav Wilf: Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities. WINE 2009: 351-361 |
| i3 | | Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz: Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks. CoRR abs/0907.2049 (2009) |
| i2 | | Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. CoRR abs/0909.1072 (2009) |
| 2008 | ||
| c12 | | Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir: Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. SAGT 2008: 58-69 |
| c11 | | Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir: Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. WINE 2008: 109-117 |
| 2007 | ||
| j3 | | Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker: Hidden-Action in Network Routing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 25(6): 1161-1172 (2007) |
| c10 | | Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 84-92 |
| c9 | | |
| 2006 | ||
| j2 | | Michal Feldman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, John Chuang, Ion Stoica: Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 24(5): 1010-1019 (2006) |
| c8 | | Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan: Combinatorial agency. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 18-28 |
| c7 | | Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman: Implementation with a bounded action space. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 62-71 |
| c6 | | Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan: Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. WINE 2006: 353-364 |
| 2005 | ||
| j1 | | Michal Feldman, John Chuang: Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems. SIGecom Exchanges 5(4): 41-50 (2005) |
| c5 | | Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker: Hidden-action in multi-hop routing. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 117-126 |
| c4 | | Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang: A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 127-136 |
| c3 | | |
| i1 | | Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang: A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters. CoRR abs/cs/0502019 (2005) |
| 2004 | ||
| c2 | | Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, John Chuang: Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 102-111 |
| 2003 | ||
| c1 | | Michal Feldman, Shelley Zhuang: Workshop Report for 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS '03) 21-22 February 2003 - Claremont Hotel, Berkeley, CA, USA. IPTPS 2003: 1-20 |
Colors in the list of coauthors
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