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Yuko Sakurai
2010 – today
- 2013
[i1]Hiromitsu Hattori, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Toramatsu Shintani: A Dynamic Programming Model for Determining Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions: Quasi-linear Utility and Budget Constraints. CoRR abs/1301.2276 (2013)- 2012
- [c25]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo: Generalized Partition Mechanism: Framework for Combining Multiple Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. IAT 2012: 502-509
- [c24]Yasuyuki Shirai, Koji Tsuruma, Yuko Sakurai, Satoshi Oyama, Shin-ichi Minato: Incremental Set Recommendation Based on Class Differences. PAKDD (1) 2012: 183-194
- 2011
- [c23]Yuko Sakurai, Suguru Ueda, Atsushi Iwasaki, Shin-ichi Minato, Makoto Yokoo: A Compact Representation Scheme of Coalitional Games Based on Multi-Terminal Zero-Suppressed Binary Decision Diagrams. PRIMA 2011: 4-18
- 2010
- [j5]Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Keyword auction protocol for dynamically adjusting the number of advertisements. Web Intelligence and Agent Systems 8(4): 331-341 (2010)
- [c22]Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo: Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 633-640
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c21]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai: Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS (1) 2009: 265-272
- [c20]Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution. AAMAS (2) 2009: 1285-1286
- [c19]Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. CP 2009: 623-638
- [c18]Yuki Iwanari, Makoto Tasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yuko Sakurai: Introducing Communication in Dis-POMDPs with Finite State Machines. IAT 2009: 267-270
- [c17]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Koutarou Suzuki: Secure Keyword Auction: Preserving Privacy of Bidding Prices and CTRs. IAT 2009: 419-422
- 2008
- [c16]Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Beyond quasi-linear utility: strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols. AAMAS (3) 2008: 1609-1612
- [c15]Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Keyword Auction Protocol for Dynamically Adjusting the Number of Advertisements. IAT 2008: 410-416
- [c14]Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols. IAT 2008: 417-423
- [c13]Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yasumasa Saito, Makoto Yokoo: Gsp-exr: gsp protocol with an exclusive right for keyword auctions. WWW 2008: 1089-1090
- 2007
- [j4]Hiromitsu Hattori, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Toramatsu Shintani: Determining bidding strategies in sequential auctions: Quasi-linear utility and budget constraints. Systems and Computers in Japan 38(8): 72-83 (2007)
- 2005
- [j3]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. Decision Support Systems 39(2): 241-252 (2005)
- 2004
- [j2]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 46(1): 174-188 (2004)
- 2003
- [c12]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo: A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values. AAMAS 2003: 329-336
- 2002
- [c11]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo: An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol. AAMAS 2002: 104-111
- 2001
- [j1]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. Artif. Intell. 130(2): 167-181 (2001)
- [c10]Hiromitsu Hattori, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Toramatsu Shintani: Determining bidding strategies in sequential auctions: quasi-linear utility and budget constraints. Agents 2001: 83-84
- [c9]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids. ICDCS 2001: 137-145
- [c8]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids. IJCAI 2001: 1089-1094
- [c7]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids. IJCAI 2001: 1095-1101
- [c6]Hiromitsu Hattori, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Toramatsu Shintani: A Dynamic Programming Model for Determining Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions: Quasi-linear Utility and Budget Constraints. UAI 2001: 211-218
- 2000
- [c5]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 110-115
- [c4]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Koji Kamei: An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. CP 2000: 549-553
- [c3]Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara: The Effect of False-name Declarations in Mechanism Design: Towards Collective Decision Making on the Internet. ICDCS 2000: 146-153
- [c2]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Koji Kamei: An efficient approximate algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2000: 30-37
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [c1]Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Shigeo Matsubara: A Limitation of the Generalized Vickrey Auction in Electronic Commerce: Robustness against False-name Bids. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 86-92
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2013-06-13 23:05 CEST by the dblp team