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 | 2013 | |
|---|---|---|
| i15 |      | Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: On the complexity of strong Nash equilibrium: Hard-to-solve instances and smoothed complexity. CoRR abs/1304.1351 (2013) |
| 2012 | ||
| j40 | | Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, John P. Sullivan: TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems Using Game Theory. AI Magazine 33(4): 59-72 (2012) |
| j39 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 2-14 (2012) |
| j38 | | Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: First-order algorithm with $${\mathcal{O}({\rm ln}(1{/}\epsilon))}$$ convergence for $${\epsilon}$$ -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. Math. Program. 133(1-2): 279-298 (2012) |
| c186 | | John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm: Dynamic Matching via Weighted Myopia with Application to Kidney Exchange. AAAI 2012 |
| c185 | | |
| c184 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Rational market making with probabilistic knowledge. AAMAS 2012: 645-652 |
| c183 | | John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm: Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: theory and reality. AAMAS 2012: 711-718 |
| c182 | | |
| c181 | | Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh: Strategy purification and thresholding: effective non-equilibrium approaches for playing large games. AAMAS 2012: 871-878 |
| c180 | | Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Matthew Paul Johnson, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, Milind Tambe, John P. Sullivan: TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems. IAAI 2012 |
| c179 | | Samuel Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Safe opponent exploitation. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 587-604 |
| c178 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 790-807 |
| c177 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Satinder Singh: Lossy stochastic game abstraction with bounds. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 880-897 |
| c176 | | Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: Combining local search techniques and path following for bimatrix games. UAI 2012: 286-295 |
| i14 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. CoRR abs/1207.1368 (2012) |
| i13 | | Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: Combining local search techniques and path following for bimatrix games. CoRR abs/1210.4858 (2012) |
| 2011 | ||
| j37 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Inventory-based versus Prior-based Options Trading Agents. Algorithmic Finance 1(2): 95-121 (2011) |
| j36 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive markets for donating to charities. Artif. Intell. 175(7-8): 1251-1271 (2011) |
| j35 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. Discrete Optimization 8(2): 147-159 (2011) |
| c175 | | Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh: Strategy Purification. Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling 2011 |
| c174 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions. AMMA 2011: 19-30 |
| c173 | | Michael Benisch, Tuomas Sandholm: A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Data. AMMA 2011: 40-52 |
| c172 | | Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Game theory-based opponent modeling in large imperfect-information games. AAMAS 2011: 533-540 |
| c171 | | |
| c170 | | Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm: Approximating Optimal Combinatorial Auctions for Complements Using Restricted Welfare Maximization. IJCAI 2011: 379-385 |
| c169 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Makers via Homogeneous Risk Measures. WINE 2011: 314-325 |
| 2010 | ||
| j34 | | Tuomas Sandholm: The State of Solving Large Incomplete-Information Games, and Application to Poker. AI Magazine 31(4): 13-32 (2010) |
| j33 | | Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithms for Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) Sets. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 38: 513-534 (2010) |
| j32 | | Samid Hoda, Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: Smoothing Techniques for Computing Nash Equilibria of Sequential Games. Math. Oper. Res. 35(2): 494-512 (2010) |
| c168 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction. AAAI 2010 |
| c167 | | |
| c166 | | William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes: Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. AAAI 2010 |
| c165 | | Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models? AAMAS 2010: 183-190 |
| c164 | | |
| c163 | | |
| c162 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish: Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation. AAMAS 2010: 873-880 |
| c161 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Speeding up gradient-based algorithms for sequential games. AAMAS 2010: 1463-1464 |
| c160 | | Piotr Krysta, Tomasz P. Michalak, Tuomas Sandholm, Michael Wooldridge: Combinatorial auctions with externalities. AAMAS 2010: 1471-1472 |
| c159 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 367-376 |
| c158 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves: A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 377-386 |
| 2009 | ||
| c157 | | Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm: Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions. IJCAI 2009: 46-52 |
| c156 | | Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Equilibria in Multiplayer Stochastic Games of Imperfect Information. IJCAI 2009: 140-146 |
| c155 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: How Pervasive Is the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility? IJCAI 2009: 233-238 |
| c154 | | Pranjal Awasthi, Tuomas Sandholm: Online Stochastic Optimization in the Large: Application to Kidney Exchange. IJCAI 2009: 405-411 |
| c153 | | Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. SAGT 2009: 60-71 |
| c152 | | Michael Benisch, Patrick Gage Kelley, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm, Janice Y. Tsai, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Paul Hankes Drielsma: The impact of expressiveness on the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms for location-sharing. SOUPS 2009 |
| 2008 | ||
| j31 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: New complexity results about Nash equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 63(2): 621-641 (2008) |
| j30 | | Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2) (2008) |
| c151 | | Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm: A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms. AAAI 2008: 17-23 |
| c150 | | Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh: Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI 2008: 30-37 |
| c149 | | Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: First-Order Algorithm with O(ln(1/e)) Convergence for e-Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games. AAAI 2008: 75-82 |
| c148 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Expectation-Based Versus Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction in Imperfect Information Games: An Experimental Comparison Using Poker. AAAI 2008: 1454-1457 |
| c147 | | William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier: Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI 2008: 1499-1502 |
| c146 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information. AAMAS (2) 2008: 903-910 |
| c145 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: A heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker player: discretized betting models and automatically generated equilibrium-finding programs. AAMAS (2) 2008: 911-918 |
| c144 | | Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for 3-player no-limit Texas Hold'em tournaments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 919-925 |
| c143 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: GS3 and Tartanian: game theory-based heads-up limit and no-limit Texas Hold'em poker-playing programs. AAMAS (Demos) 2008: 1647-1648 |
| e3 |  | Lance Fortnow, John Riedl, Tuomas Sandholm (Eds.): Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL, USA, June 8-12, 2008. ACM 2008, isbn 978-1-60558-169-9 |
| 2007 | ||
| j29 | | |
| j28 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $35 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AI Magazine 28(3): 45-58 (2007) |
| j27 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007) |
| j26 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games. J. ACM 54(5) (2007) |
| j25 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007) |
| c142 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing: how we conducted $35 billion of generalized combinatorial auctions. ICEC 2007: 349-350 |
| c141 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction of Sequential Games, and Holistic Equilibrium Analysis of Texas Hold'em Poker. AAAI 2007: 50-57 |
| c140 | | Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities. AAAI 2007: 58-65 |
| c139 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $25 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AAIM 2007: 426 |
| c138 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Better automated abstraction techniques for imperfect information games, with application to Texas Hold'em poker. AAMAS 2007: 192 |
| c137 | | Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: 07431 Executive Summary - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007 |
| c136 | | Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: 07431 Abstracts Collection - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007 |
| c135 | | Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham: Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214 |
| c134 | | |
| c133 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier: Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506 |
| c132 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-Theoretic Approaches to Branching in Search. IJCAI 2007: 2286-2292 |
| c131 | | David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 295-304 |
| c130 | | Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. WINE 2007: 57-69 |
| e2 | | Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm (Eds.): Computational Issues in Social Choice, 21.10. - 26.10.2007. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07431, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007 |
| 2006 | ||
| j24 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006) |
| j23 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets. Games and Economic Behavior 55(2): 321-330 (2006) |
| j22 | | Tuomas Sandholm, David Levine, Michael Concordia, Paul Martyn, Rick Hughes, Jim Jacobs, Dennis Begg: Changing the Game in Strategic Sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive Competition Enabled by Optimization. Interfaces 36(1): 55-68 (2006) |
| j21 | | Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Online algorithms for market clearing. J. ACM 53(5): 845-879 (2006) |
| c129 | | Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets. AAAI 2006: 598-604 |
| c128 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006: 627-634 |
| c127 | | Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006: 697-702 |
| c126 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: A Competitive Texas Hold'em Poker Player via Automated Abstraction and Real-Time Equilibrium Computation. AAAI 2006: 1007-1013 |
| c125 | | |
| c124 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528 |
| c123 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544 |
| c122 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. AAMAS 2006: 545-547 |
| c121 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. AAMAS 2006: 1127-1134 |
| c120 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: A Texas Hold'em poker player based on automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation. AAMAS 2006: 1453-1454 |
| c119 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90 |
| c118 | | Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 160-169 |
| 2005 | ||
| j20 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. Management Science 51(3): 374-390 (2005) |
| c117 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi: Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254 |
| c116 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260 |
| c115 | | Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2005: 267-274 |
| c114 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488 |
| c113 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer: Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501 |
| c112 | | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515 |
| c111 | | |
| c110 | | |
| c109 | | |
| c108 | | Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham: Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. Computing and Markets 2005 |
| c107 | | Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: 05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005 |
| c106 | | Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: 05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005 |
| c105 | | |
| c104 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. Computing and Markets 2005 |
| c103 | | Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312 |
| c102 | | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669 |
| c101 | | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64 |
| c100 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity of common voting rules. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87 |
| c99 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of (iterated) dominance. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97 |
| c98 | | |
| c97 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152 |
| e1 | | Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm (Eds.): Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 05011, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005 |
| 2004 | ||
| j19 | | Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research 5: 649-667 (2004) |
| c96 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control. AAAI 2004: 73-79 |
| c95 | | Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields: Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions. AAAI 2004: 204-211 |
| c94 | | Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm: Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218 |
| c93 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225 |
| c92 | | Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2004: 232-237 |
| c91 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14 |
| c90 | | |
| c89 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135 |
| c88 | | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies. AAMAS 2004: 254-260 |
| c87 | | Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 386-393 |
| c86 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 394-401 |
| c85 | | Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 810-817 |
| c84 | | Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids. AAMAS 2004: 1418-1419 |
| c83 | | Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16 |
| c82 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004 |
| c81 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60 |
| c80 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141 |
| c79 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263 |
| c78 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 264-265 |
| c77 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267 |
| c76 | | Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 268-269 |
| 2003 | ||
| j18 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artif. Intell. 145(1-2): 33-58 (2003) |
| j17 | | Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede: Compressing Two-Dimensional Routing Tables. Algorithmica 35(4): 287-300 (2003) |
| c75 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24 |
| c74 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. AMEC 2003: 73-91 |
| c73 | | Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions. AMEC 2003: 92-108 |
| c72 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing. AAMAS 2003: 273-280 |
| c71 | | Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2003: 1014-1015 |
| c70 | | Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. COLT 2003: 13-25 |
| c69 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms. CP 2003: 19-36 |
| c68 | | |
| c67 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90 |
| c66 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98 |
| c65 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618 |
| c64 | | |
| c63 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788 |
| c62 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106 |
| c61 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing. IJCAI 2003: 1649- |
| c60 | | Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm: Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time. NIPS 2003 |
| c59 | | Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 176-185 |
| c58 | | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 196-197 |
| c57 | | Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 212-213 |
| c56 | | Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Using value queries in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 226-227 |
| c55 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231 |
| c54 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233 |
| c53 | | Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 236-237 |
| c52 | | Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214 |
| c51 | | |
| i12 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. CoRR cs.AI/0307017 (2003) |
| i11 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. CoRR cs.GT/0307002 (2003) |
| i10 | | Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003 (2003) |
| i9 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. CoRR cs.GT/0307006 (2003) |
| i8 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. CoRR cs.GT/0307016 (2003) |
| i7 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. CoRR cs.GT/0307018 (2003) |
| 2002 | ||
| j16 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artif. Intell. 135(1-2): 1-54 (2002) |
| j15 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou: Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts. Artif. Intell. 142(2): 239-264 (2002) |
| j14 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems. AI Magazine 23(3): 89-100 (2002) |
| j13 | | Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust. Computational Intelligence 18(4): 501-514 (2002) |
| j12 | | Tuomas Sandholm: eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. Computational Intelligence 18(4): 656-676 (2002) |
| c50 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319 |
| c49 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Xiao Feng Wang: (Im)possibility of Safe Exchange Mechanism Design. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 338-344 |
| c48 | | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 367-372 |
| c47 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397 |
| c46 | | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 34-51 |
| c45 | | Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 69-86 |
| c44 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. AAMAS 2002: 69-76 |
| c43 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents. AAMAS 2002: 135-142 |
| c42 | | |
| c41 | | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2002: 168-169 |
| c40 | | Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation. AAMAS 2002: 310-311 |
| c39 | | |
| c38 | | Xiaofeng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm: Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games. NIPS 2002: 1571-1578 |
| c37 | | Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Online algorithms for market clearing. SODA 2002: 971-980 |
| c36 | | |
| i6 | | Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR cs.GT/0205066 (2002) |
| i5 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. CoRR cs.GT/0205073 (2002) |
| i4 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. CoRR cs.GT/0205074 (2002) |
| i3 | | |
| i2 | | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. CoRR cs.GT/0205076 (2002) |
| 2001 | ||
| j11 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artif. Intell. 132(2): 183-217 (2001) |
| j10 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach. Games and Economic Behavior 35(1-2): 212-270 (2001) |
| c35 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2001: 1102-1108 |
| c34 | | |
| c33 | | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2001: 256-259 |
| 2000 | ||
| j9 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 3(1): 73-96 (2000) |
| j8 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Decision Support Systems 28(1-2): 165-176 (2000) |
| j7 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Qianbo Huai: Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House. IEEE Internet Computing 4(2): 80-86 (2000) |
| j6 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study. J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 12(1): 23-42 (2000) |
| c32 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 48-55 |
| c31 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 90-97 |
| c30 | | |
| c29 | | Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation. ICDCS 2000: 154-160 |
| c28 | | Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies. ICMAS 2000: 71-78 |
| c27 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou: Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts. ICMAS 2000: 247-254 |
| c26 | | |
| c25 | | Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede: Optimal Flow Aggregation. SWAT 2000: 462-475 |
| 1999 | ||
| j5 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artif. Intell. 111(1-2): 209-238 (1999) |
| j4 | | |
| j3 | | Fernando Tohmé, Tuomas Sandholm: Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-rational Self-interested Agents. J. Log. Comput. 9(6): 793-815 (1999) |
| c24 | | Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Time-Quality Tradeoffs in Reallocative Negotiation with Combinatorial Contract Types. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 3-10 |
| c23 | | Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 11-16 |
| c22 | | |
| c21 | | |
| c20 | | Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study. Agents 1999: 40-47 |
| c19 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Sandeep Sikka, Samphel Norden: Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts. IJCAI 1999: 535-541 |
| c18 | | Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 1999: 542-547 |
| c17 | | Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Contracting with uncertain level of trust. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 1999: 15-21 |
| 1998 | ||
| c16 | | Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 38-45 |
| c15 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 46-53 |
| c14 | | Hyacinth S. Nwana, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Tuomas Sandholm, Carles Sierra, Pattie Maes, Robert H. Guttman: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, Challenges and Some Viewpoints. Agents 1998: 189-196 |
| c13 | | Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Sequencing of Contract Types for Anytime Task Reallocation. AMET 1998: 54-69 |
| c12 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. CIA 1998: 113-134 |
| c11 | | Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation. ICMAS 1998: 10-11 |
| c10 | | Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents. ICMAS 1998: 26-33 |
| i1 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. CoRR cs.MA/9810005 (1998) |
| 1997 | ||
| j2 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents. Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 99-137 (1997) |
| j1 | | |
| c9 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Fredrik Ygge: On the Gains and Losses of Speculation in Equilibrium Markets. IJCAI (1) 1997: 632-639 |
| 1996 | ||
| c8 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 126-133 |
| c7 | | |
| 1995 | ||
| c6 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework. ICMAS 1995: 328-335 |
| c5 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Robert H. Crites: On Multiagent Q-Learning in a Semi-Competitive Domain. Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems 1995: 191-205 |
| c4 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents. IJCAI (1) 1995: 662-671 |
| c3 | | Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Equilibrium Analysis of the Possibilities of Unenforced Exchange in Multiagent Systems. IJCAI (1) 1995: 694-703 |
| 1994 | ||
| c2 | | Daniel E. Neiman, David W. Hildum, Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas Sandholm: Exploiting Meta-Level information in a Distributed Scheduling System. AAAI 1994: 394-400 |
| 1993 | ||
| c1 | | Tuomas Sandholm: An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations. AAAI 1993: 256-262 |
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