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 | 2012 | |
|---|---|---|
| j15 |      | Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan, Tristan Tomala: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games and Economic Behavior 74(1): 222-234 (2012) |
| j14 | | Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala: Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. Int. J. Game Theory 41(3): 651-669 (2012) |
| 2011 | ||
| j13 | | Tristan Tomala: Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems. Operations Research 59(3): 754-763 (2011) |
| j12 | | Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence. J. Economic Theory 146(5): 1770-1795 (2011) |
| 2009 | ||
| j11 | | Tristan Tomala: Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior 67(2): 682-694 (2009) |
| j10 | | Olivier Gossner, Rida Laraki, Tristan Tomala: Informationally optimal correlation. Math. Program. 116(1-2): 147-172 (2009) |
| r1 | | Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala: Repeated Games with Complete Information. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009: 7616-7630 |
| 2008 | ||
| j9 | | Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala: Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks. J. Cryptology 21(2): 250-279 (2008) |
| j8 | | Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala: Playing off-line games with bounded rationality. Mathematical Social Sciences 56(2): 207-223 (2008) |
| 2007 | ||
| j7 | | Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala: Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Math. Oper. Res. 32(2): 413-424 (2007) |
| j6 | | Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall. Math. Oper. Res. 32(4): 873-889 (2007) |
| 2006 | ||
| j5 | | Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala: Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation. Math. Oper. Res. 31(1): 13-30 (2006) |
| 2004 | ||
| j4 | | Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala: Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. Games and Economic Behavior 47(1): 124-156 (2004) |
| j3 | | Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala: Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior 49(2): 313-344 (2004) |
| 1998 | ||
| j2 | | Tristan Tomala: Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. Int. J. Game Theory 27(1): 93-109 (1998) |
| j1 | | |
| 1 | Olivier Gossner | |
| 2 | Yuval Heller | |
| 3 | Johannes Hörner | |
| 4 | Rida Laraki | |
| 5 | Stefano Lovo | |
| 6 | Jérôme Renault | |
| 7 | Marco Scarsini | |
| 8 | Eilon Solan |
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